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1 Introduction
The consumption tax is a potentially powerful instrument of fiscal policy. Economic theory sug-
gests that, depending on the reform, an upcoming tax-rate change would incentivize consumers to
bring forward or postpone purchases. Since most countries levy broad-based consumption taxes,
they could exploit this intertemporal response and raise or discourage consumption through a pre-
announced change of the baseline tax rate. Feldstein (2002) proposes a sequence of pre-announced
consumption tax increases in order to stimulate current consumption. Combined with a reduction
in income taxes, this would enable fiscal policy to boost consumption without increasing budget
deficits. Hall (2011) points out that pre-announced consumption tax increases could be useful to
counter the decline in the US demand for consumer durables. Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles
(2013) use a New Keynesian model to show that engineering over time an increasing path of con-
sumption taxes could be an essential part of an unconventional fiscal policy at the zero lower bound
of the nominal interest rate.
There is, however, considerable uncertainty about consumer responsiveness at the intertemporal
margin (Attanasio and Weber, 2010), all the more so since consumers may not be fully aware of
the consumption tax burden (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009). In addition, conventional assump-
tions about the pass-through of taxes into prices might not hold, and the consumer response might
deviate from theoretical predictions due to capital market imperfections. In order to make concrete
policy recommendations, it is, therefore, important to evaluate the effects of pre-announced tax
reforms on consumer behavior empirically.
The existing literature offers mixed results. One common finding is high consumer awareness
of upcoming changes in the baseline rate of the value-added tax (VAT). Crossley, Low, and Slee-
man (2014) analyze the effects of a temporary VAT cut implemented as a fiscal stimulus in the
UK in 2008 and find strong positive effects on consumer sentiment. Exploring the effect of a
pre-announced VAT increase in Japan in 1997, Cashin and Unayama (2016) also document high
consumer awareness of the upcoming reform. D’Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2016) find that the
2007 VAT increase in Germany raised German households’ inflation expectations and their will-
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ingness to purchase durable goods before the tax reform relative to other European households.
With regard to actual sales, results are mixed, however. Crossley, Low, and Sleeman (2014) pro-
vide evidence of a positive effect on consumer spending for retail sales in the UK relative to other
European countries. They also document that prices started to increase before the temporary tax
cut was reversed. Cashin and Unayama (2016), who employ detailed household panel data that
allow them to distinguish between goods according to their durability and storability, find only
small intertemporal substitution effects for the 1997 tax increase in Japan.
To analyze the effects of pre-announced consumption tax reforms, we utilize a unique micro-level
data set of major domestic appliances at the product level on a monthly basis from 2004 until 2013
in 22 European countries, which underwent numerous reforms of the baseline tax rate of the VAT
in recent years (DeMooij and Keen, 2013). A key characteristic of the dataset is the availability
of information on both prices and units sold, which allows us to study separately the effects of
tax reforms on consumer prices and sales for approximately 72,000 different products (models) in
the basic specification. We employ a consistent identification strategy for sales and price effects,
which exploits the trading of identical products in multiple countries: Counterfactuals for sales and
prices of a product in a country experiencing a consumption tax reform are constructed from the
contemporaneous sales and prices of exactly the same product in other EU countries.
We generalize the analysis of pre-announced consumption tax rate changes by studying multiple
tax reforms, and explore reform heterogeneity along two dimensions: in terms of the length of
the implementation lag after announcement as in Mertens and Ravn (2012) and in terms of the
motivation behind tax reforms. More specifically, we distinguish endogeneous and exogeneous
tax reforms following the narrative approach to the analysis of fiscal policy put forward by Romer
and Romer (2010).
Our empirical results document that changes in baseline consumption tax rates are fully and
quickly passed into consumer prices and strongly affect the time path of consumer spending. Sales
of consumer durables are found to differ substantially before and after a tax-rate change. The dif-
ference before and after implementation is not merely offsetting the short-run demand effect for
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durables on the verge of a tax reform, but points to a strong intertemporal shift in total consumer
demand. When we incorporate the information on when a policy reform has been announced,
our results support full pass-through of consumption tax changes into consumer prices. The pass-
through occurs within a short time period of two quarters. When focusing solely on reforms that
are classified as exogenous with regard to the business cycle, we find that the price pass-through
is quicker. The sales effects are similar. Quantitatively, our results show that an exogenous 1 per-
centage point increase in consumption taxes causes a drop in consumption by almost 5 percent. In
addition, purchases of durable goods increase temporarily by about 2.5 percent in the last month
before a tax increase.
In exploiting regional information within the European Union, our identification strategy is related
to the analysis of local sales taxes in the US by Agarwal, Marwell and McGranahan (2016), who
study the consumer response to State sales-tax holidays that temporarily exempt specific items.
They use household survey data as well data on credit card transactions to identify differences in
the tax treatment by households’ or merchants’ place of residence and find a significant increase
in spending that is not offset in the periods before or after the tax holiday. Baker, Johnson and
Kueng (2017) use scanner data from the Nielsen Consumer Panel to study consumer responses
to state and local sales tax changes at the household and store levels and find that consumption
spending decreases by 2% if the tax rate increases by 1 percentage point. In contrast to state and
local sales taxes, the consumption tax effects studied in this paper refer to the baseline tax-rate of a
general consumption tax (VAT). As this rate is applied to most consumer goods and not on business
purchases,1 it is much closer to the type of consumption tax actually discussed in the fiscal policy
literature. Since our analysis focuses on EU countries rather than local jurisdictions, cross-border
shopping, addressed in the literature on local sales taxes as, for instance, in Agrawal (2015), is
arguably less of an issue. We, nevertheless, perform robustness checks to confirm this.
Given its focus on consumer durables in the context of fiscal stimulus policies, this paper is also
closely related to the empirical literature on the effects of temporary vehicle scrappage programs
1 Ring (1999) shows that about a third of the tax base of the US states’ general sales taxes consists of business
purchases.
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aiming to stimulate consumer spending and promote fuel efficiency. Mian and Sufi (2012) and
Green, Melzer, Parker and Rojas (2016) find that the main effect of the US 2009 subsidy was to
shift consumer spending within a year. This finding is confirmed by Li, Linn and Spiller (2013).
Hoekstra, Puller and West (2017) also find strong short-term effects on car sales, but document that
sales perform much worse in the post-program period compared to the counterfactual, pointing to
long-term losses in consumer spending, which the authors attribute to fuel efficiency restrictions.
While we also find temporary effects on the demand for durables, our results indicate that these
effects are even stronger in case of exogenous tax reforms, which do not intend to provide a stim-
ulus.
Our analysis provides new evidence on the pass-through of consumption taxes. While it is fre-
quently assumed that the pass-through is complete and immediate, some recent papers test the
validity of this assumption empirically. Carbonnier (2007) studies two major VAT decreases in
France and finds that the pass-through is limited, especially for car sales. Carare and Danninger
(2008) use monthly price-index data at a two-digit level to study how the 2007 VAT increase in
Germany affected consumer prices. Even though their results support full shifting of the tax to the
consumer, they find evidence of “inflation smoothing” in the sense that adjustments in prices start
before implementation. Using a similar classification, Benedek, deMooij, Keen and Wingender
(2015) provide a more comprehensive analysis based on monthly price-index data for European
countries. For changes in the standard VAT rate, they confirm full price pass-through, and for
durables they find pre-reform price adjustments. With regard to timing, the authors’ estimates
show that price adjustments start 7 to 9 months before a reform and continue for 8 months after.2
Our analysis of price effects differs, since we use primary data that allows us to analyze the
pricing of individual products. Further, unlike previous work, which usually does not take reform-
announcements into account, we show that information about the timing of the announcement and
2Benedek et al. (2015) also note that the pass-through of the consumption tax differs between goods taxed at the
baseline and at reduced rates. For the latter they find limited pass-through. The latter is confirmed by Kosonen (2015),
who also documents asymmetries in the pass-through of tax increases and decreases (see also Benzarti, Carloni, Harju,
Kosonen, 2017).
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the length of the implementation lag matters and should not be ignored when assessing the effect
of pre-announced reforms. Apart from confirming full pass-through of the consumption tax, our
results also indicate that price adjustment differs depending on the economic background of the
reform. If we focus on tax reforms that are not related to GDP shocks, prices for durables are
found to display even quicker adjustment with pre-reform effects starting only two months before
implementation and full pass-through reached in the first month after implementation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a discussion of the theoretical predictions
regarding the effects of a preannounced tax-rate change on the sales of consumer durables. Section
3 describes the dataset, while Section 4 provides graphical evidence of the effect of consumption
tax increases on the sales and prices of “white goods” in Germany and Spain. Section 5 outlines
our empirical methodology. The regression results for sales and prices are presented in Section 6,
including various robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions for Consumption of Durables
Before we explain in detail, how we measure and identify effects of consumption tax-rate changes
empirically, this section gives a brief overview of the theoretical predictions. A theoretical analysis
that derives predictions formally is provided in an appendix. The basic life-cycle model with
additively separable utility suggests that the level of consumption will differ before and after a pre-
announced tax rate change due to intertemporal substitution. This holds in particular, if the tax rate
change is fully passed through into consumer prices and if the consumer expects this to happen. If
the future tax rate increases, current consumption increases relative to future consumption and so
does the value of the optimal stock of durables (Cashin and Unayama, 2016). The opposite holds
in case of a tax decrease.
Tax rate changes may additionally exert income effects. A forward-looking consumer would be
aware that a future tax increase is equivalent to a decline in the real present value of income. If
the policy to change the tax rate is not anticipated, the income effect could reinforce the decline in
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consumption at the time of implementation. With anticipation, however, the income effect might be
present as early as the announcement. When implementation happens later, income effects should
not matter, except for myopic behavior or credit constraints.
With regard to consumer durables, however, the consumer response to the implementation of a
tax rate change is not only determined by intertemporal substitution. Consumers can also take
advantage of the fact, that the value of the stock of durables changes. Facing an increase of the tax
rate, for instance, consumers can increase their stock of durables, temporarily, in order to benefit
from the appreciation of the stock. If the tax rate is going to decrease, the consumer can reduce
the stock of durables in order to limit the decline in the value. To formalize the effect of expected
price changes on the time-path of consumption, Ogaki and Reinhard (1998) employ the user cost
for the service flow of the durable good. This cost varies inversely with the present value of the
price of durables and increases with the rate of depreciation. As we show formally in a theoretical
appendix, with full price pass-through, a future tax increase causes the expected future price to
rise, and, hence, the user cost displays a temporary decline before implementation and vice versa
for a tax decrease.
The extent to which the actual purchases of durables are affected by the temporary change in the
user cost depends critically on the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between durables and
nondurables. If this elasticity is large, the consumer would substitute away from nondurables at
times when the user cost is low. This would result in a stronger temporary expansion (contraction)
of purchases of durable goods before a tax increase (decrease) (see theoretical appendix). Cashin
and Unayama (2016) find that the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution is small, however, which
suggests that temporary changes in the user cost would have limited effects.
Whereas the temporary effect on the user cost before the tax rate change will be offset after the
implementation, the change in the steady state level of the stock of durables before and after a
pre-announced tax rate change causes a non-recurring effect on purchases of durables. In the ab-
sence of adjustment cost, this long-term effect approximately reveals the intertemporal substitution
elasticity (see theoretical appendix). However, it seems unlikely that the consumer can adjust the
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stock of durables at no cost. Adjustment cost can affect the demand for durable goods in a number
of ways. First, if expansion and reduction of the stock of durables are costly, the stock of durables
might not reach its new steady-state level immediately after implementation of the tax-rate change.
Second, the change in the steady-state level may trigger adjustments of the stock of durables even
before implementation. Third, in the presence of adjustment cost, consumers should be less eager
to take advantage of the temporary change in the user cost.
The consequences for purchases depend, however, on the nature of the adjustment cost. With con-
vex adjustment cost, frequently used in factor demand models (e.g., Shapiro, 1986, Hamermesh
and Pfann, 1996), the temporary and long-term changes in the stock of durables will be distributed
over time. In case of a quadratic adjustment cost function, the purchases of durables by the individ-
ual household would follow a partial adjustment process, which starts and ends some time before
and after the tax-rate change (see theoretical appendix). However, the symmetry of adjustment
cost for increases and decreases in the stock of durables seems questionable, as a large decrease
may involve selling of the durables in a secondary market, where the price may be depressed due
to information asymmetry and “lemons costs” (Bar-Ilan and Blinder, 1992). If adjustment cost is
higher for decreases in the stock of durables, depending on whether the tax rate change is positive
or negative, adjustments before and after the tax-rate change take more or less time (see theoretical
appendix).
If adjustment cost is non-convex, the upcoming tax-rate change will have implications for the
timing of purchases. In particular, if the adjustment of the stock of durables is associated with
fixed or lumpy transaction cost, the purchase of durables by the individual household would follow
an (s,S) policy, where purchases are made rather infrequently (Grossmann and Laroque, 1990,
Bar-Ilan and Blinder, 1992). Only if the actual stock of durables deviates sufficiently from its
optimal level, a purchase is made. The precise implications for the aggregate demand for durables
depend on the cross–sectional distribution of the vintage of the existing stock of durables (Adda
and Cooper, 2000). However, the time path of aggregate expenditures need not be much different
from a model with convex adjustment cost (Attanasio, 2000).
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The above predictions for consumption and for the consumers’ purchases of durables rest on the
assumption of a full and instantaneous pass-through of tax rate changes into the consumer price.
Though this is a standard assumption in models with constant returns to scale and perfect competi-
tion (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002), under conditions of imperfect competition even in the long-run,
other degrees of shifting are a possibility (Besley and Rosen, 1999).
Besides the issue of whether the price pass-though is complete, the question arises how fast price
adjustment takes place. In the presence of menu cost, the pass-through of cost changes may be
delayed (Nakamura and Zerom, 2008). In the context of pre-announced tax rate changes, retailers
may also start adjusting prices before implementation. Those pre- and post reform changes in
prices could cause earlier consumer responses before implementation and later responses after
implementation (see theoretical appendix).
3 Data Description
The dataset is provided by the market research company Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK)
Retail and Technology GmbH and consists of monthly panel data at the product (model) level on
unit sales and scanner prices of durable “white goods” for all countries of the European Union,
except Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta. The white goods encompass
eight major categories: Cookers, refrigerators (coolers), dishwashers, freezers, cooktops (hobs),
hoods, tumble driers and washing machines. Each individual product has a unique identification
number (id) and a set of physical characteristics. The identifier is the same over time and across
countries in case a product is sold in more than one Member State. Table A-1 summarizes the
coverage of the data by country and category and Table A-4 provides a detailed description of
all available category-specific features. The time period generally extends for 117 months, from
January 2004 until September 2013, although data coverage is shorter for some countries.
The units sold of a product in a given country and a specific month is the sum of all sales of
this product across all retailers in the country in the respective month. The corresponding price
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is a monthly unit sales-weighted average of all prices for this product across retailers. Prices are
inclusive of consumption taxes and possible discounts received by consumers. Refer to Section
A.1.1 in the Appendix for more details on the data generation process.
Annual descriptive statistics disaggregated by product category are presented in Table A-2. For
each year, the raw data covers around 110,000 different products with 62 million units sold, and an
average annual market size of 26 billion Euro. In terms of quantity and value of sales, refrigerators
and washing machines constitute the two biggest categories. While the annual number of products
is stable at around 110,000, the composition changes over time, with new products entering the
market and older ones exiting. The life cycle, i.e. the change in the number of units sold over time
for products introduced in a particular year is depicted in Figure 1.3 Clearly, sales are inversely
proportional to a product’s age. In the first year, sales of new products account for, on average, 20-
25% of the total units sold, peak in the second year, and peter out afterwards. About 80% of new
entries drop out of the market in 5 to 6 years. This pattern does not vary much across individual
product categories.
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the basic data per model, country and month.
The monthly sales of a product averaged over time, countries and models amount to 50 units and
exhibit considerable dispersion ranging from 0 to 25,000 units. The average price in Euro is 527.
Detailed analysis of the dataset in terms of missing values, zero values, outliers, and a description
of all transformations applied to the data for the purposes of descriptive statistics and the generation
of estimation samples are provided in Section A.1.2 in the Appendix.
Two statistics refer to a product’s life-cycle: the “product age”, reporting the number of months the
sales of a product are recorded in any country, and the “market age”, which reports the number of
months a product is sold in a specific market (country). As the mean of the market age is only three
months less than the mean product age, the data points at a rather synchronized market introduction
3Products’ years of introduction are based on the assumption that the first year a product appears in the data (in
any country), is the year, in which it was introduced. GfK provided us with a sample plot with exit and entry of
fridges based on actual dates of introduction and exit, which was closely mirrored by products’ appearance in and
disappearance from the data.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
A. Basic dataset
№ Units sold 50.35 185 0 24,965 12,296,125
Price (Euro) 527 388 0.004 29,826 10,887,367
Product age (months) 30.46 23.22 1 117 20,651,469
Market age (months) 26.87 22.27 1 117 20,651,469
Rank 892 798 1 5,364 20,651,469
B. Estimation sample (identical products sold in two or more countries)
№ Units Sold 59.96 181 0* 19,062 4,126,760
dlog(UNITS) -0.016 0.892 -22.3 22.2 4,126,760
Price (Euro) 559 367 0.300 11,392 4,032,501
dlog(PRICE) -0.003 0.092 -0.693 1.10 4,032,501
Market Age (Months) 25.65 17.01 2 117 4,129,009
Rank 450 486 1 5,364 4,129,009
R50 0.180 0.384 0 1 4,129,009
R100 0.307 0.461 0 1 4,129,009
Standard VAT rate 0.205 0.023 0.15 0.27 4,129,009
Unemployment rate 8.54 4.08 3.1 27.8 4,129,009
C. Estimation sample (products with identical characteristics sold in two or more countries)
№ Units Sold 67.06 213 0* 24,965 7,784,367
dlog(UNITS) -0.022 0.917 -22.7 22.5 7,784,367
Price (Euro) 539 361 0 23,230 7,496,238
dlog(PRICE) -0.003 0.094 -0.693 1.10 7,596,937
Market age (months) 25.82 18.0 2 117 7,784,367
Rank 553 577 1 5,364 7,784,367
R50 0.159 0.366 0 1 7,784,367
R100 0.274 0.446 0 1 7,784,367
Standard VAT rate 0.201 0.023 0.15 0.27 7,784,367
Unemployment rate 8.78 4.14 3.1 27.8 7,784,367
The table shows summary statistics per model per country per month averaged across time, countries, and models.
Data in Panel B is restricted to products sold in at least two countries at the same time. Data in Panel C is restricted
to groups of products with an identical set of characteristics traded in at least two countries. Product (market) age
captures the number of months a product is sold (in a specific country). A best-selling model in any country, year,
and category has a rank 1. R50/R100 = 1 if a model reaches a rank ∈[1,50]/[1,100] at least once. The exact value
of the entries marked with asterisk is 1.00E−08. For detailed description of the data generation process and all data
transformations applied to Panels A, B, and C, refer to Section A.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: PRODUCT LIFECYCLE BY YEAR OF INTRODUCTION
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Note: The figure depicts the annual evolution of unit sales by products’ year of introduction. The inter-
section points with a vertical line at a given year denote the number of unit sales within that year based on
their years of introduction. For example, in 2007, sales of products introduced in 2005 constituted 21%
of total sales, products launched in 2006 – 34%, and new products (launched 2007) –16%. The remaining
29% of sales were of products first appearing in the data in 2004 and not shown in the figure.
of products across countries. The table also provides statistics on the rank of a product. All models
in the data are ranked according to their sales. The rank variable is category-, country-, and year-
specific. Thus, the best selling refrigerator in Germany in a given year has a rank one. R50 (R100)
are binary indicators for top-selling models. They equal unity if a model is part of the top 50(100)
best-selling products within its respective category at least once during its life cycle.
Panels B and C present descriptive statistics on two restricted samples used in the empirical analy-
sis in Section 6. Panel B removes all products sold in only one country in a given year, and from the
remaining products, only those sold contemporaneously in several countries are kept. Compared
to Panel A, the restriction leads to the loss of more than half of all observations for units sold and
prices, but within a year the products in this sample comprise 51% of all units sold and generate
58% of the value of sales on average (see Table A-2 and Section A.1.2).
The number of products sold in multiple countries increases over time. Figure 2 reports the chang-
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ing composition of sales disaggregated by number of countries in which products are marketed.
While products sold in a single country generated 67% of the total number of units sold in 2004,
their share dropped to 35% in 2012, with sales of products sold in two to five countries steadily
taking over.
Figure 2: COMPOSITION OF UNIT SALES BY NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN
WHICH PRODUCTS ARE SOLD
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Note: The figure depicts the development over time in the share of units sold (percent from total units) of
products sold in one country, two to five countries, six to ten countries and in eleven or more countries.
The observation of sales and prices of individual products in multiple countries means that the con-
sumption tax rate varies not only across countries over time, but – for models sold simultaneously
in multiple markets – the tax rate also varies within each cell of observations comprising the sales
and prices of an individual model in a specific time period. It is this characteristic of the data that
we exploit in our main identification strategy as explained in Section 5.
Unlike Panel B, which looks at identical products sold in multiple markets, Panel C of Table 1
focuses on groups of products with an identical set of physical characteristics sold in multiple
markets. Products with missing characteristics are removed (Section A.1.2). This sample re-
incorporates models sold in a single country and is used for a robustness check in the subsequent
empirical analysis.
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The GfK data is merged with data on the consumption taxes in the 22 countries under consideration.
The baseline VAT rate is the relevant tax rate for white goods in these countries as they are not
subject to reduced VAT, zero rating or exemptions.4 While from 2004 until 2013 the VAT rates
in Austria, Belgium, France, Sweden and Denmark remained unchanged, the other countries in
the data altered the standard rate 33 times, which provides time and within country/within product
variation.
The magnitude of the tax rate changes varies from ±1 pp. to ±5 pp., and their frequency varies
from one to four reforms per country in the time period under investigation. Close to 80% of all tax
reforms considered in this paper took place between 2008 and 2013, with the vast majority being
tax increases (tax decreases occurred in only 5 instances). Table A-3 in the Appendix describes in
detail the magnitude of changes in the standard VAT rate, the date of implementation, as well as
the date reforms were first announced. For the announcement dates, we rely on official statements
by authorities, or, if such statements were not found, on media reports.
Among the thirty three reforms considered in this paper, there is substantial heterogeneity in the
time between announcement and implementation, i.e. the implementation lag. As shown in Figure
A-1 in the Appendix, the implementation lag ranges from one and a half years to three days. The
median length of the time-interval is a little over a quarter of a year. In seven cases, announcements
occurred less than a month before their implementation. Such short anticipation horizons are
typically observed in countries facing economic and fiscal difficulties such as the Baltic states in
2009 or Greece in 2010. Similarly, the temporary VAT cut in the UK in December 2008, intended
as a fiscal stimulus to boost sales, became effective one week after its announcement.5
The 2008 UK reform fits well within what the so-called narrative approach to analyzing fiscal
4There are non-VAT instruments to stimulate the consumption of energy efficient household goods, summarized in
Copenhagen Economics (2008). Some policies are, for example, lump-sum rebates to consumers for the replacement
of old household appliances with new ones from a higher energy efficiency class. These programs, however, are
unlikely to confound the empirical effects to VAT hikes as they typically focus only on a small subset of products in
very narrow time frame.
5The 2008 United Kingdom reform is the only explicit temporary tax change. In all other countries, tax changes
where enacted as permanent.
13
policy would classify as an endogenous tax change. Given its motivation to stimulate consumer
spending in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is a tax reform undertaken “to offset develop-
ments that would cause output growth to differ from normal” (cf. Romer and Romer, 2010, p.769).
Relying on endogenous tax reforms when studying how sales and prices of durables react to tax
changes could be misleading, since it might be difficult to disentangle the effect of these devel-
opments from that of government actions taken in response. A similar issue arises with respect
to the above-mentioned pro-cyclical fiscal policy measures observed in the Baltic countries and
in Greece, enacted as a consequence of a fiscal crisis and limited access of these governments to
international credit markets (Gunter, Riera-Crichton, Végh and Vuletin, 2017).
We address the role of policy endogeneity by categorizing the 33 VAT reforms studied in this
paper in terms of endogeneity/exogeneity and check whether our results change when we exclude
endogenous reforms. To this end, we rely on Gunter et al. (2017), who assembled a dataset of 96
tax reforms of baseline consumption taxes worldwide in the period 1970-2014 and classified them
based on the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2010). Table A-3 adds information on two
reforms not classified by Gunter et al. (2017), and separates all reforms into 18 endogenous and
15 exogenous tax changes.
4 The Cases of Germany and Spain
The above analysis assumes that consumers are well aware of a forthcoming tax increase/decrease.
This section focuses in more detail on Germany and Spain to check this assumption using data
on the press coverage of tax reforms. It also explores whether sales and price effects of tax-rate
changes are visible in the raw data.
The German VAT increase of 3pp. in 2007 is discussed in detail by D’Acunto et al. (2016) and
Carare and Danninger (2008). As a reform not tackling current or projected economic conditions, it
meets the exogeneity criteria of Romer and Romer (2010).6 In contrast, the VAT increases in Spain
6Based on Romer and Romer’s (2010) classification, tax changes serving long-run objectives, or those addressing
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in 2010 (by 2pp.) and 2012 (by 3pp.) took place in a more difficult macroeconomic environment
and were clearly motivated by fiscal predicaments in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
Consequently, Gunter et al. (2017) classify both Spanish reforms as endogenous given their GDP-
driven and pro-cyclical nature. The German reform and the first Spanish reform were announced
well in advance – 14 months and 10 months, respectively, whereas the implementation lag for the
second Spanish VAT increase was only a month and a half.
Figure A-2 in the Appendix graphs the number of articles in the German media discussing the
VAT increase, based on four major non-tabloid newspapers in the country. The announcement
and implementation dates for the tax reform are marked with reference lines. Two clear spikes in
the number of articles are observed, one at the announcement date and one in the month before
the implementation, even though the reform was being discussed continuously throughout 2006.
Similarly to Germany, Figure A-3 depicts the number of articles discussing the Spanish reforms
based on three main newspapers, with the second reform receiving almost double the coverage,
which is not surprising given its short announcement and political context.
Figure A-4 in the Appendix shows annual growth rates of sales and prices in Germany and Spain
relative to the same month of the previous year. Panel A depicts a strong growth in sales, especially
in the last two to three months before the implementation of the VAT increase in Germany, and a
substantial drop afterwards. The period after implementation is characterized by substantially
higher prices. This pattern is consistent with the theoretical predictions for sales and with full and
instantaneous price pass-through.7 Carare and Danninger (2008), who study the same tax reform
past economic conditions such as tax increases dealing with an inherited budget deficit, are treated as exogenous.
7The growth rate of unit sales jumps also in December 2005, one month after the VAT increase was announced
(see also Fig. A-4). When we disaggregated the response by categories of products (see Fig. A-5 in the Appendix),
we found that three specific categories drive this announcement response: Cooktops, hoods, and cookers, which are
usually sold as part of a kitchen unit. Since the data allows us to consider total sales disaggregated by a type of retailer
(independent traders, technical superstores and chains, furniture/kitchen specialists, mass merchandisers/DIYs, and
from 2006 onwards, internet sales, we were able to determine that the response at the announcement date is entirely
driven by sales of Kitchen and Furniture specialising stores. A possible explanation is that those durables may have
substantial delivery lags, which would induce consumers to buy early in order to ensure that the lower VAT rate applies
to their purchases. The dashed black line in Figure A-6 depicts the same growth rate, but cooktops, hoods and cookers
are removed. The announcement response then falls by half. Finally, the figure also shows growth rate of sales in
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episode in Germany, but focus on all CPI items liable to VAT relative to non-VAT goods, report a
similar pre-reform jump in sales, but find that price increases were phased in during 2006.
As shown in Panel B of Figure A-4, the market for white goods in Spain shrank considerably from
2007 to 2012. Against this negative trend, the two VAT reforms are associated with temporary
pre-reform peaks in sales. In contrast to the German case, at least after the first reform, sales seem
not to recover. With regard to price effects, a price increase is visible after the first reform, but a
year after the reform prices are falling again. The second VAT increase is also not clearly reverting
the negative price trend.
5 Methodology
Changes of the standard tax rate of general consumption taxes and VAT apply equally to most
goods. Hence, there is no readily available control group of comparable goods, whose tax rate is
kept constant. As a consequence, empirical research is often left with the comparison of sales and
prices before and after tax-rate changes, which may be affected by other shocks. If, however, the
sales and prices of a specific good are observed simultaneously in different regions, under certain
conditions, the effects of a consumption tax reform in one region can be identified by using as
counterfactual outcomes the developments in sales and prices in the other regions in which this
good is available. The data for durables described in Section 3 enables us to follow this strategy,
since we observe the sales and prices of identical products within the EU common market. In
addition, the data covers a period characterized by a relatively high frequency of standard VAT rate
changes both across and within EU member states.
Under the conventional assumption of full and instantaneous pass-through of the consumption
tax into consumer prices, the above theoretical discussion suggests that a pre-announced change
of the tax rate affects the time path of the sales of durables in three periods. In case of a tax
neighbouring Austria, a closely integrated market to the German economy. Austria did not change its standard VAT
rate and the sales growth rate does not deviate much around zero.
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increase, for example, the first period affected is the time preceding the tax-rate change, since
consumers take advantage of the temporary decline in the user cost of the stock of durable goods
and bring purchases forward. Second, at the time of implementation, sales fall due to intertemporal
substitution and the reversal of the user cost. Third, in the subsequent time period, sales recover
offsetting the temporary decline. Measuring the rate of change in sales with the log difference of
units sold, ∆ log(UNITS)icd , of a product i in country c at date d, we formulate the following
estimation equation:
∆ log(UNITS)icd =
p∑
j=1
a jL− j∆τcd + b∆τcd +
q∑
j=1
d jL j∆τcd + aXicd (5.1)
+ αid + ρc + γcm(d) + uicd .
Note that the date d varies by month and year such that each observation is associated with a
specific month m(d) and year t(d). ∆τcd is the current change in the tax rate relative to the previous
month, L− j∆τcd is a lead term, capturing the j-month-ahead change in the tax rate, and L j∆τcd is
the change in the tax rate lagged by j-months, where p and q indicate the number of leads and lags
of the tax-rate change. If adjustment cost is unimportant and price-pass through is quick, the time
intervals before and after the tax-rate change will be short and p,q = 1. In this case, a1 > 0, b < 0
and d1 > 0. However, if adjustment cost is large or if the price-pass through takes more time,
setting p,q = 1 would exclude systematic effects on pre-reform outcomes, and hence, could result
in a bias (see Malani and Reif, 2015). Hence, the empirical analysis allows p,q > 1, and tests for
tax effects using wider pre- and post-reform windows.
αid denotes a product-date-specific fixed effect that absorbs any product specific movements in
sales. Incorporating a product fixed effect is essential since each product has specific features that
distinguish it from other products in the market. But, given technological progress and product
innovation, the (relative) quality of a product and, hence, its attractiveness to consumers vary over
time. This is reflected in the striking product-cycle patterns displayed in Figure 1. Inclusion of
product-date fixed effects αid ensures that identification only comes from differences in the growth
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rate of sales of the same product across countries.8
Identification of the tax effect on sales thus relies on changes in the consumption tax treatment that
affect only a sub-group of the observations within each product-date cell. In case of a consumption
tax reform in country c, the sales of product i at date d are compared to the sales in all other
countries in which product i is available. Consequently, we restrict the sample to products sold
in at least two countries at the same time. Note that the product-date-specific fixed effects also
capture differences in the size of individual cells driven by the varying number of countries, in
which products are traded.
Since the variation in tax policy takes place at country level over time, standard errors produced
by a fixed-effects panel regression at product level may suffer from random-group bias (Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan). Therefore, we provide standard error estimates adjusted for clustering
at country level among each product category.
A key assumption for causal interpretation is the Common-Trend Assumption, which, in the current
setting, requires that, conditional on all controls, had there been no reform in country c, the sales
of a product would have followed the same time trend as the sales of this product in the no-reform
countries r , c. As different trends might be associated with the business cycle, Xicd includes
the monthly unemployment rate in country c as an explanatory variable. In order to deal with
differences in seasonality of sales across countries, we include a country-specific fixed effect for
each month γcm(d) together with a set of country-specific fixed effects ρc. Differences in trends
might also reflect heterogeneity in market entry. Therefore, we employ an indicator for the time
period a product has been sold in a specific country: The market age, M.age, varies by country
within a product-date cell, if this product does not enter all markets at the same time. For the
purpose of capturing non-linear product cycle effects, M.age is also entered squared.
Since the data provides separate information on prices, we explore whether and to what extent the
data supports complete and immediate pass-through of taxes into prices. To this end, we follow the
8In an analysis of subsidy effects on car sales at product level, Li, Linn and Spiller (2013) follow a similar approach
and employ product-year-specific fixed effects.
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same estimation strategy and use differences in outcomes within a product-date cell to identify tax
effects. In order to test for pre-reform pass-through of tax changes into consumer prices and for
lagged consumer price adjustments, we consider a specification with higher order leads and lags
of the tax-rate change
∆ log(PRICE)icd =
P∑
j=1
A jL− j∆τcd + B∆τcd +
Q∑
j=1
D jL j∆τcd + αXicd (5.2)
+ αid + ρc + γcm(d) + vicd .
∆ log(PRICE)icd denotes the difference in the log consumer price of product i in country c in
month d relative to the previous month. As before, αid , ρc, and γcm(d) denote product-date-,
country-, and country-month-specific fixed effects. P determines the order of lead terms and Q the
order of lagged terms of ∆τcd . Estimation of eq. (5.2) enables us to test whether there is full pass-
through of consumption taxes into consumer prices and how fast the pass-trough takes place. The
sum
∑P
j=1 A j+B+
∑Q
j=1 D j gives the long-term effect of the change in the VAT rate on prices, which
can be interpreted as a pass-through elasticity (Benedek et al. (2015)). In the current framework,
an elasticity of unity would indicate complete pass-through. Under-shifting (over-shifting) occurs
when the elasticity is smaller (greater) than one. Instantaneous pass-through is included as a
special case, which requires that B = 1 and A j = D j = 0.
The optimal width of a window around a reform, or, equivalently, the values of P and Q, could
be selected via statistical testing that checks whether a gradual extension of the specification with
wider windows of tax effects provides a better fit.9 With the introduction of higher-order leads,
however, this procedure would employ information about an upcoming tax reform, regardless of
whether it has already been announced or not.
To provide empirical estimates that take account of the information set of agents, at least in a
stylized way, we utilize the announcement dates reported in Table A-3 and replace j-period ahead
lead terms, L− j∆τcd , with their expected values Ed− j
[
L− j∆τcd
]
taking account of the precise point
9An alternative statistical procedure starts out with a long window and tests whether the window size can be
reduced. This is, for example, the strategy employed by Benedek et al. (2015) who consider a two-year time span
centered around the month of implementation.
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in time when information about an upcoming VAT change becomes available in a given country.
In particular, if a reform is announced n months in advance, we set Ed− j
[
L− j∆τcd
]
= 0, ∀ j >
n, whereas Ed− j
[
L− j∆τcd
]
= L− j∆τcd , ∀ j ≤ n. While this ensures that the specification fully
reflects publicly available information about upcoming reforms, higher-order lead terms mix pre-
reform responses with announcement effects. In addition, the estimation of higher-order-lead terms
rests on a declining number of identifying reforms (and countries) due to the varying length of
the implementation lags as shown in Fig. A-1. As a consequence, estimates of the pre-reform
response are likely biased due to composition effects. Table A-5 lists the number of reforms and
countries identifying the coefficients for leads of order j ∈ [1,14]. Clearly, the number of reforms
captured by a lead term is declining for higher order leads. In order to mitigate possible biases from
composition effects, the empirical analysis employs a parsimonious specification with a limited
number of lead terms. Figure A-1 shows that the median implementation lag is about a quarter.
Therefore, we focus on leads in the interval j ∈ [1,3]. Seven out of the 33 VAT reforms analyzed in
this paper were announced less than a month before the tax rate change became effective (Figure
A-1). In these cases, one can neither separate the effects of government policy from those of
the economic shocks that may have triggered the government intervention in the first place, nor
distinguish the income effect associated with the announcement of tax-policy changes from the
effects on the consumption path. For this reason, we also provide results of specifications excluding
these reforms. In the empirical section below, we generally consider the same pre-reform window
range for unit sales as for prices.
Given the size of the EU common market, tax rate changes in a single EU country can be affected
to exert no important effects on the total market. However, if a product is sold just in say two
markets, and one market is hit by a consumption-tax-induced demand shock, the country without a
tax rate change might not serve as a valid control group. The reason is that, a strong demand shock
in one country may change prices and hence exert effects also in the other country. An alternative
reason for cross-country effects of tax reforms is cross-border shopping.
Generally, the existence of those cross-country effects of tax rate changes would violate what
is referred to as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption in the econometric literature (e.g.,
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Lechner, 2011). To see whether this is a relevant concern, we test sales and price regressions in
subsamples with products sold in more than 2, 3, 4 etc. markets. In the presence of cross-country
effects, the empirical estimates of sales effects would vary in specifications using products sold in
an increasing number of countries.10
Restricting the sample to products sold in two or more countries for the purposes of identification
can lead to estimates that are specific to this group, if products sold in a single country differ
systematically from those sold in multiple countries. The latter might be of higher quality and
more expensive, compared to single-country products, which are probably domestically produced
or specifically designed for a market. The incentives to buy before and after consumption tax
reforms could, therefore, vary between these two types of products.
As a robustness check, we employ an alternative approach to identifying the tax effects in equations
(5.1) and (5.2), which enables us to re-incorporate single-country products into the estimation
sample by using larger cells comprising not just identical products, but a group of products with the
same characteristics. A drawback of this procedure is that, due to the limited number of available
characteristics (Table A-4), there will be heterogeneity left in the individual group-date cells. If the
basic parameters shaping the optimal time path of demand for single and multi-country products
are the same, the estimates resulting from this approach should be similar to those obtained from
specifications that focus on cells composed only of identical products.
6 Results
6.1 Basic Results
Results from a basic specification of tax effects on sales of durables following eq. (5.1) are pre-
sented in Table 2. The estimation sample includes data for 22 EU countries.11 We explore the
10As the same identification approach is used for prices, spillover effects could also bias the coefficient estimates of
eq. (5.2). Consequently, similar robustness tests are applied to the estimates of price effects.
11To avoid structural breaks stemming from the transition of Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia from national curren-
cies to Euro, data for these countries is restricted to after Jan. 1st, 2007, after Jan. 1st, 2009, and before Dec. 31st,
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effects of 33 consumption tax reforms that altered the baseline consumption tax rate. As summa-
rized in Table 1, the sample employs data for approximately 72,000 unique products sold in at least
two countries, resulting in about 1,330,000 product-date pairs, and over 4 million product-country-
date observations.
The estimation results presented in Table 2 have with pre- and post implementation periods re-
stricted to one month each. The first column of reports estimates from a specification using only
product-date and country-specific fixed effects. The second column adds a full set of country-
month dummies, which account for country-specific seasonality in sales due to differences in the
timing of holidays, for instance. In this specification, the contemporaneous tax effect is larger and
the lagged response smaller. Column (3) additionally controls for the market age, M.age, as well
as M.age2. The estimates indicate that sales growth declines with the number of months a product
is sold in a country.12 As a robustness check, column (4) additionally contains country-specific
year effects, which might be important in the presence of annual budgeting of households, or due
to annual economic shocks from fiscal policy. Compared to the results in column (3), augmenting
the specification with country-year dummies yields similar results – the differences in the estimated
slope parameters for the tax effects are below the standard error for all tax terms.
The point estimates in column (3) indicate that a tax increase by 1 percentage point causes sales
to rise by 2.4% in the last month with a low tax rate. Once the higher tax rate is implemented,
sales drop by about 4.4% relative to the month before the reform. These effects are consistent with
the theoretical predictions derived under the assumption of full and instantaneous pass-through of
taxes into consumer prices However, the coefficient of the lagged change in the tax rate is at odds
with the theoretical predictions, since it indicates that sales do not recover in the month after the tax
change. Instead, with a tax-rate increase of 1 percentage point, sales decline further by 1.7%. With
this caveat in mind, note that the sum of the coefficients for lead, lagged, and contemporaneous tax
change effects is about 3.7 in the basic specifications, indicating that spending drops by 3.7% in
the long-run.
2010, respectively.
12To avoid reporting very small coefficients M.age and M.age2 are scaled by 1/100 and 1/1002 in the estimations.
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Table 2: BASIC ESTIMATES OF SALES EFFECTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F∆τd 2.615 2.444 2.426 2.421
(0.366) (0.314) (0.315) (0.340)
∆τd -3.817 -4.338 -4.350 -4.412
(0.648) (0.415) (0.415) (0.436)
L∆τd -2.146 -1.700 -1.717 -1.754
(0.433) (0.289) (0.291) (0.313)
Unempl 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
M.age -0.485 -0.532
(0.038) (0.038)
M.age2 0.420 0.468
(0.040) (0.041)
Constant -0.023 -0.024 0.058 0.085
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.015)
Cumulative Effects
Total (a1 + b + d1) -3.349 -3.594 -3.640 -3.744
(0.544) (0.453) (0.454) (0.571)
Month-country effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year-country effects No No No Yes
N 4,126,760 4,126,760 4,126,760 4,126,760
Product-date effects 1,331,154 1,331,154 1,331,154 1,331,154
Products 72,056 72,056 72,056 72,056
Notes: Regressions in columns (1)-(4) are based on data for 22 EU countries. The data is restricted to goods
sold contemporaneously in at least 2 countries. The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of sales
∆ log(UNITS). The monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . The lead term, F∆τd , captures
all reforms in the month before their implementation. The lag term, L∆τd , refers to the month after implementation.
Unempl is the monthly unemployment rate. M.age is the number of months a product appears in the data in a specific
country, scaled by 1/100. All specifications include a full set of product-date specific (id) and country-specific fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by product category-country.
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6.2 Price Effects
The basic estimates of sales effects presented above rest on the conventional assumption of full
and instantaneous pass-through of taxes in consumer prices. To test this assumption and to come
up with a possibly more accurate empirical representation of the price response, this subsection
studies the dynamics of price adjustment to VAT rate changes.
Table 3 reports results of a regression of the monthly (log) change in consumer prices on tax-
rate changes following eq. (5.2) with varying lengths of the pre- and post-reform windows. All
specifications include an identical set of fixed effects and control variables as in column (3) of
Table 2. Column (1) reports a contemporaneous price increase of 0.22% if the tax rate increases
by 1 percentage point, clearly rejecting the null hypothesis of full and instantaneous pass-through.
Column (2) includes the tax-rate changes in the preceding as well as in the following month, with
both coefficients being significantly positive. The magnitude and statistical significance of the
leading and lagged terms indicate that the pass-through for major domestic appliances starts before
a reform becomes effective and continues for some time after implementation. The cumulative
effect, as reported in the lower portion of the table, suggests that within these three months, about
three quarters of the tax-rate change is shifted onto the consumer. According to the corresponding
F-statistic, full pass-through can still be rejected at usual levels of significance. Widening the
window to three months before and after implementation yields an almost identical estimate of the
total pass-through, although the specification clearly points to a price response as early as a quarter
of a year before the policy adoption.
The specifications in columns (2) and (3) employ forward terms of tax-rate changes but do not
account for the different implementation lags of reforms. As discussed above, in several cases,
this means that the estimation uses information on tax policy that, in fact, was not available to
consumers. To remedy this, the specifications in columns (4) and (5) employ expected values of
upcoming tax-rate changes. These variables take account of the actual information set by restrict-
ing leading terms to zero in the months when an upcoming tax reform has not yet been announced.
For the short window of one month before and after implementation (column (4)), the estimated
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Table 3: PRICE EFFECTS
Reforms All All n ≥ 1 n>3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
F3∆τd 0.154
(0.033)
F2∆τd -0.104
(0.064)
F∆τd 0.116 0.116
(0.031) (0.031)
E
[
F3∆τd
]
0.220 0.250 0.229
(0.037) (0.037) (0.043)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
0.045 0.034 0.116
(0.027) (0.028) (0.033)
E [F∆τd] 0.126 0.126 0.141 0.142 0.158
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035)
∆τd 0.219 0.219 0.217 0.219 0.218 0.164 0.163 0.100
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.038) (0.037) (0.043)
L∆τd 0.388 0.387 0.389 0.389 0.432 0.431 0.507
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
L2∆τd -0.126 -0.128 -0.125 -0.250
(0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.043)
L3∆τd 0.086 0.086 0.104 0.160
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.041)
Cumulative Effects
Total 0.219 0.723 0.730 0.734 0.956 0.737 0.999 1.021
(0.047) (0.050) (0.069) (0.050) (0.070) (0.047) (0.070) (.086)
Pre-reform 0.116 0.166 0.126 0.391 0.141 0.426 0.504
(0.031) (0.087) (0.031) (0.055) (0.032) 0.056) (0.061)
Post-reform 0.608 0.564 0.608 0.565 0.596 0.573 0.517
(0.043) (0.062) (0.043) (0.062) (0.038) 0.052) (0.056)
Pass-through F(1) 30.00 15.34 28.46 0.39 30.82 0.00 0.06
N 4,032,508 4,032,508 4,032,508 4,032,508 4,032,508 3,916,700 3,916,700 3,747,035
Product-date
effects
1,302,880 1,302,880 1,302,880 1,302,880 1,302,880 1,275,887 1,275,887 1,227,989
Products 71,223 71,223 71,223 71,223 71,223 70,663 70,663 71,167
Notes: Regressions are based on data for 22 EU countries. The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm
of the actual consumer price ∆ log(PRICE). The data is restricted to goods sold contemporaneously in at least 2
countries. Estimates in columns (6) and (7) are based on a reduced sample, in which observations in countries with
reforms announced less than a month before implementation, are removed around the respective reform date. The
monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd for all reforms that were
announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All specifications include a full set
of product-date, country, and country-month fixed effects. The monthly unemployment rate, Unempl, and the number
of months a product appears in the data in a specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2 are controlled for but not
reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by product category-country.
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magnitude of the total pass-through, 73%, is not statistically different from the case with no an-
nouncements (column (2)). However, the ex-ante price adjustment rises to 39% once a longer
window is employed, with all leading terms in specification (5) exhibiting larger and consistently
positive coefficients in contrast to specification (3). As the post-reform pass-through implied by
specification (5) is 57%, the cumulative price effect is not significantly different from unity at usual
levels of significance (F-statistic of 0.55). This suggests that full price pass-through occurs within
a seven-month period – three months before and three months after the tax-rate change. The sub-
stantially higher estimate of the pre-reform pass-through in column (5) in comparison to (3) clearly
highlights the importance of the announcement information: Despite a sufficiently long window,
the specification in (3) would point to an incomplete pass-through of taxes.
Columns (6) and (7) exclude observations associated with reforms pre-announced by less than a
month, since the pre-reform adjustment may capture the effect of the announcement itself, as well
as the effect of the economic circumstances that have motivated the government to act quickly.13
The pre-reform pass-through effects are found to be qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
reported in columns (4) and (5). The estimates in column (7) indicate that a tax rate increase by
1 percentage point causes consumer prices to rise by 0.43% before the reform and by 0.57% after
the reform, one third of which is a contemporaneous effect. Again, the cumulative price effect in
this specification is equal to unity, which is consistent with full price pass-through.
A closer inspection of column (7) of Table 3 reveals that price pass-through starts a quarter prior
to a tax-rate change and is already completed by the second month after implementation. Figure 3
provides a graphical representation of this development by plotting the cumulative coefficients of
a regression including four leads and lags of the tax rate change. All in all, it takes five months for
the tax-rate change to be fully reflected in consumer prices.
Even though the results presented in columns (6) and (7) focus on tax-rate changes that were an-
nounced before implementation, it seems possible that they capture income effects to some extent.
13Observations are excluded six months before and six months after implementation for products in the relevant
countries and years, without removing the product from the data in non-reform years, or its sales in other countries.
See Section A.1.2 for description of the exact procedure.
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As a robustness check, we restrict attention to those tax-rate changes, where the time-interval be-
tween announcement and implementation is longer. Following the classification of Mertens and
Ravn (2012), a tax shock may be regarded as anticipated only if the time-interval exceeds 90 days.
Column (8) provides results obtained by focusing on the corresponding tax-rate changes. The
results are found to be similar indicating full price pass-trough with half of the price adjustment
taking place after the implementation. This suggests that income effects are not important for the
empirical adjustment path of prices.
The pass-through estimates are also robust to a more demanding identification strategy achieved
through sample reduction. Excluding reforms announced less than a month before their entry into
force and using expected values of tax-rate changes as in columns (6) to (7) of Table 3, Table
A-6 in the Appendix gradually restricts the sample to products traded in more and more countries
simultaneously. This ensures that there are multiple observations from countries without a reform
within each product-date cell. The null hypothesis of full pass-through cannot be rejected at usual
levels of significance, even when the sample is down to 6,690 products traded in at least eight
countries.
6.3 Generalized Sales Effects
Given the findings in the previous section, the data supports full price pass-through in accordance
with the conventional view in the literature. However, the price pass-through is not instantaneous,
and, in particular, prices start to rise before tax reforms. This implies that the pre-reform response
of sales might not be confined to the last period before the reform. In addition, the recovery of
demand might not take place immediately after implementation. To test for implications of non-
instantaneous pass-through, Table 4 applies a specification with additional leads and lags of the tax
rate change. All specifications include a full set of product-date, country and country-month fixed
effects and the same controls as in column (3) of Table 2. For convenience, column (1) repeats
the results of this specification. Column (2) uses a wider window of three months before and after
the tax rate change, with the results pointing at a drop in purchases three months before a tax-rate
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change. With regard to lagged terms, demand continues to decline in the second month after the
tax rate change, and only the third month shows a recovery. The specifications in columns (3)
and (4) employ the expected rather than the actual tax-rate change to capture pre-reform effects.
The coefficients for the pre- and post-reform effects are similar to those in columns (1) and (2).
Columns (5)-(6) report estimates obtained after excluding observations before and after reforms for
which the time-interval between announcement and implementation is less than a month. Column
(7) focuses on reforms for which this interval exceeds three month.
Across specifications with the same order of leads and lags the results show minor differences in-
dicating that the parsimonious specification for sales is not much affected by implementation lags.
Only the exclusion of reforms implemented on short notice in columns (5) and (6) point to some-
what stronger effects in the month of implementation. The estimation results presented in column
(7) are based on the sub-set of tax-rate changes announced more than three months before imple-
mentation. Compared with column (6), the results are qualitatively similar: the total cumulative
effect is about the same and also the relative magnitudes of pre- and post implementation effects
are similar. To check further for announcement effects, we added a variable using an indicator of
the tax-rate change at the time of the announcement, but did not detect any significant response.
Also, adding higher order lags of the tax-rate change did not yield significantly different results.
Visually, the estimated coefficients from a regression adding fourth order lead and lag are displayed
in Panel B of Figure 3.
The identification of tax effects in our analysis relies on differences in the consumption tax treat-
ment of a product across countries. As noted in Section 5, this strategy might be invalidated by
cross-country effects of tax-rate changes. To check for the presence of such effects, Table A-7 in
the Appendix shows estimation results obtained by gradually restricting the sample to products
sold in an increasing number of countries, which ensures that identification of the effect of tax-rate
changes on sales comes from a larger number of control countries within product-date cells. The
estimates are similar to the benchmark results presented in column (6) of Table 4.
Table A-8 in the Appendix performs another robustness check on whether the estimates using
28
Table 4: GENERALIZED ESTIMATES OF SALES EFFECTS
Reforms All All n ≥ 1 n>3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
F3∆τd -0.850
(0.296)
F2∆τd -0.218
(0.306)
F∆τd 2.426 2.397
(0.315) (0.313)
E
[
F3∆τd
]
-0.833 -0.937 -1.345
(0.362) (0.371) (0.365)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
-0.331 -0.416 -0.030
(0.316) (0.320) (0.428)
E [F∆τd] 2.349 2.320 2.464 2.455 2.241
(0.324) (0.324) (0.327) (0.326) (0.383)
∆τd -4.350 -4.357 -4.351 -4.358 -4.797 -4.806 -4.387
(0.415) (0.414) (0.415) (0.414) (0.440) (0.439) (0.477)
L∆τd -1.717 -1.689 -1.716 -1.702 -1.432 -1.417 -1.891
(0.291) (0.290) (0.291) (0.292) (0.305) (0.304) (0.325)
L2∆τd -0.456 -0.453 -0.452 0.186
(0.289) (0.289) (0.309) (0.361)
L3∆τd 1.197 1.198 1.193 0.702
(0.306) (0.306) (0.290) (0.302)
Cumulative Effects
Total -3.640 -3.976 -3.717 -4.159 -3.765 -4.379 -4.525
(0.454) (0.553) (0.453) (0.592) (0.506) (0.612) (0.724)
Pre-reform 2.426 1.329 2.349 1.156 2.464 1.102 0.865
(0.315) (0.454) (0.324) (0.512) (0.327) (0.504) (0.558)
Post-reform -6.066 -5.304 -6.067 -5.315 -6.229 -5.481 -5.390
(0.417) (0.531) (0.417) (0.530) (0.450) (0.582) (0.660)
N 4,126,760 4,126,760 4,126,760 4,126,760 4,006,044 4,006,044 3,834,262
Product-date effects 1,331,154 1,331,154 1,331,154 1,331,154 1,302,736 1,302,736 1,254,537
Products 72,056 72,056 72,056 72,056 71,492 71,492 72,003
Notes: Regressions are based on data for 22 EU countries. The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm
of sales, ∆ log(UNITS). The data is, restricted to goods sold contemporaneously in at least 2 countries. Estimates
in columns (5) and (6) are based on a reduced sample, in which observations in countries with reforms announced
less than a month before implementation, are removed around the respective reform date. The monthly change in
the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd for all reforms that were announced n > j
periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All specifications include a full set of product-
date, country, and country-month-specific fixed effects. The monthly unemployment rate, Unempl, and the number
of months a products appears in the data in a specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2 are controlled for but not
reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by product category-country.
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Figure 3: DYNAMICS OF SALES AND PRICES
A. Cumulative Price Pass-through
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Note: Panel A depicts the cumulative sum of the estimated coefficients in a price regression extending
the specification in Column (7) of Table 3 by including a fourth lead and lag of the percentage change
of the VAT rate. Panel B depicts the estimated coefficients from a corresponding extension of the
regression for changes of sales in Column (6) of Table 4 (both not reported). The month of the reform
is denoted by zero. In both panels the shaded area captures the 95% confidence interval based on the
robust estimate of the covariance matrix.
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products traded in at least two countries can be extrapolated to the full sample. It employs an
alternative estimation approach, which, as explained in Section 5, groups observations not based
on the product identifier, but based on product characteristics. Hence, single-country products
are included in the estimation sample as they are grouped together with other products having an
identical set of characteristics.14 Despite heterogeneity within group-date cells as indicated by
larger standard errors, the estimates in Table A-8 remain very close to those reported in Table 4.
The above theoretical discussion indicated that pre-reform price effects may arise depending on the
price adjustment. If price adjustment is costly, and, therefore, infrequent, firms may start altering
prices immediately after announcement. An alternative explanation rests on imperfect competition.
Producers that have some market-power may adjust their prices to take advantage of expected shifts
in consumer demand (Carare and Danninger, 2008). If imperfect competition explains pre-reform
price pass-through, we might expect that best-selling products exhibit different price pass-through
and sales patterns around a tax-rate change compared to products that sell fewer units. In order
to test this expectation, as explained in Section 3, we create binary indicators for market power
using the within-year, within-category, and within-country ranking of products on the basis of
their volume of sales. The dummy variables R50(R100) equal one for all products that reach ranks
between one and fifty (one and hundred) in at least one year throughout their life-cycle.15
Table A-9 in the Appendix reports results of specifications extending equations (5.1) and (5.2)
by adding the R50 or R100 dummies and their interactions with all leads, lags as well as the
contemporaneous tax variable. Once announcement information is taken into account, the results
point to small differences between best-selling and other products. While no significant effects are
detected for the sales response, the pre-reform price pass-through of top-selling products is found
to be larger. This effect, however, is small relative to the standard error. The absence of market
power effects is also confirmed by the analysis of best selling brands, which produdes qualitatively
14This procedure results in 686 unique characteristic sets (e.g., 5 kg, 1200 spin speed front-loading washing ma-
chines etc.) and approximately 50,000 characteristic-set-date fixed effects.
15Together, the top 50 products in each of the eight categories of white goods in each country account for 53% of
the total number of units sold, on average. On average, they are 30% cheaper and sell 6 times more units per month
(average price in euro 402 (s.e. 233), average sales of 157 units (s.e. 356)) relative to products whose rank never
exceeds 50 (average price 561 (s.e. 424) and average sales of 27 (s.e. 73).
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similar effects (see Section 6.5, below).
6.4 Exogenous Reforms
Table 5 reports results only for tax reforms classified as exogenous (see Table A-3). All observa-
tions for the sales and prices of products in countries with endogenous tax reforms are removed
from the estimation six months before and six months after implementation, as well as in the month
of the reform. Given a median implementation lag of three months, this ensures that the immediate,
and any pre- and post-reform effects are removed from the estimation sample.16
The first three columns of Table 5 show results for prices, which are qualitatively similar to the
results presented in Section 6.2. The point estimates are also plotted in Figure 3. When the timing
of announcements is taken into account, full price pass-through cannot be rejected at usual levels
of significance, and about a third of the price change takes place before a reform’s implementation.
However, price adjustment occurs within a shorter time period: The price change starts two instead
of three months before the reform, and is completed in the month after implementation. Across
specifications, we find that announcement dates and implementation lags matter less: The total
pass-through estimated in column (1) is only slightly below that in columns (2) and (3) in contrast
to the considerably different results with and without announcements documented in Table 3.
Since our data refers to scanner prices they include sales. Hence, the observed price pass-through
may be affected by the frequency of sales. If sales are less frequent in recessions, the observed
price might increase before endogenous tax rate changes. But the recent literature indicates that
the frequency of sales does not decline in downturns (Coibion et al., 2015, and Anderson et al.,
2017). However, following Coibion et al. (2015) the average price paid is also affected by the
effort of consumers to search for a lower price. If consumers are putting less effort into this search
before and more effort after implementation of a tax increase, the price adjustment would show the
observed pattern.
16 For example, a product sold in Spain in July 2010 when a tax increase was implemented will have missing values
for its Spanish sales and prices from January to December 2010.
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Table 5: EXOGENOUS TAX REFORMS
Dependent variable ∆ log(PRICE) ∆ log(UNITS)
Reforms All n ≥ 1 All n ≥ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F3∆τd -0.011 -0.207
(0.051) (0.518)
F2∆τd 0.234 0.786
(0.061) (0.668)
F∆τd 0.014 2.480
(0.043) (0.606)
E
[
F3∆τd
]
0.002 0.001 -0.235 -0.252
(0.051) (0.052) (0.536) (0.541)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
0.230 0.230 0.364 0.343
(0.063) (0.063) (0.698) (0.698)
E [F∆τd] 0.041 0.045 2.485 2.469
(0.043) (0.044) (0.621) (0.618)
∆τd 0.170 0.170 0.166 -4.563 -4.563 -4.806
(0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.710) (0.710) (0.713)
L∆τd 0.362 0.362 0.359 -1.491 -1.488 -1.079
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.541) (0.541) (0.525)
L2∆τd -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.153 -0.149 -0.256
(0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.717) (0.717) (0.749)
L3∆τd 0.073 0.073 0.078 1.222 1.222 1.211
(0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.485) (0.485) (0.467)
Cumulative Effects
Total 0.824 0.861 0.867 -1.927 -2.364 -2.369
(0.153) (0.156) (0.162) (0.945) (0.934) (0.957)
Pre-reform 0.237 0.273 0.277 3.059 2.613 2.560
(0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.759) (0.772) (0.783)
Post-reform 0.587 0.588 0.590 -4.986 -4.977 -4.929
(0.109) (0.110) (0.115) (0.753) (0.753) (0.776)
Pass-through F(1) 1.32 0.80 0.68
N 3,633,795 3,633,795 3,589,523 3,724,133 3,724,133 3,676,201
Product-date effects 1,200,757 1,200,757 1,189,120 1,228,615 1,228,615 1,215,792
Products 69,614 69,614 69,277 70,455 70,455 70,118
Notes: Regression results are based on data for 22 EU countries. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the
change in the logarithm of price, ∆ log(PRICE), and in columns (4) to (6) it is the change in the logarithm of sales,
∆ log(UNITS). Observations up to two quarters before and after reforms classified as endogenous (see Table A-3) are
removed from the estimation. Estimates in columns (3) and (6) are based on a reduced sample, in which observations
in countries with reforms announced less than a month before implementation, are removed around the respective
reform date. The monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd for all
reforms that were announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All specifications
include a full set of product-date, country and country-month specific fixed effects. The monthly unemployment rate,
Unempl, and the number of months a product appears in the data in a specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2 are
controlled for but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by product
category-country. 33
Columns (4) to (6) report the corresponding sales effects. Similar to prices, we find that the sales
responses take place in a narrower time interval. Pre-reform effects are concentrated in the last-
period before the reform and, cumulatively, are much larger than in the equivalent specifications
in Table 4. Conversely, the cumulative post-reform effect is found to be slightly smaller. The
recovery in sales is of similar magnitude and shows up three months after the reform, as above.
Taken together, the cumulative results for exogenous reforms point to a stronger temporary shift
in consumer demand before implementation. The point estimates from our preferred specification
(6) suggest that a tax reform, which exogenously raises the tax rate by 1 percentage point trig-
gers a temporary growth of sales by about 2.5 percent in the month preceding the reform. After
implementation, sales drop by about 5 percent.
6.5 Differences by Brand and Product Category
The above theoretical discussion has noted that the predicted response of purchases of durables
depends on the adjustment cost. In the context of household appliances, this cost might be high, in
particular, due to the price differential between new products and the secondary market. Since the
price decline between first sale and resale will tend to be steeper for unreliable brands (Hendel, I.,
Lizzeri, 1999), we should expect the temporary effects of a tax-rate change to differ among brands.
To test for this, we have split the sample into three subgroups of products based on the brand.
Classification into high, medium and low level is based on the average price for the models sold
by brand. Qualitatively, the estimation results are similar across the three groups of observations
(see Table A-10 in the Appendix). Quantitatively, the results support much stronger short term
effects for high-level brands. Panel A of Figure 4 reports the point estimates of the effect on sales.
It shows much stronger pre-reform increases and post-reform decreases for products of top brands.
The quantitative difference is considerable with an expansion of sales of high-level brands by 3.0%
in the last month before a 1 percentage point tax increase for high-level brands compared to 2.4%
for medium and 1.0% for low level brands. Also the decline in sales after the implementation is
predicted to be much stronger for high-level brands than for other brands. The smallest effect is
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reported for low-level brands. Note that the price effects do not show major differences and no
monotonous relationship with the brand level (see Table A-11 in the Appendix).
Besides adjustment cost, the strength of the effects of tax rate changes also depends on the intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution. Household appliances with a higher (lower) elasticity of substi-
tution are expected to show a stronger (weaker) expansion before a tax rate increase. This suggests
that the effects differ between product categories. To test for those differences, we conducted a
separate analysis for various product categories. Again, the same qualitative pattern is found for
all (groups of) product categories (see Table A-12 in the Appendix), but some quantitative differ-
ences are found. Panel B of Figure 4 reports the point estimates of the effect on sales. Accordingly,
strongest effects are found for tumbledryers and dishwashers, whereas washing machines display
weakest effects. It is tempting to relate those differences to the fact that the share of households
owning washing machines is particular high, whereas the share of households owning tumbledryers
and dishwashers is much lower.17
7 Summary and Conclusions
Economic theory suggests that an upcoming tax-rate change would induce consumers to bring for-
ward or postpone spending. In addition, the demand for consumer durables is expected to display
a further temporary shock immediately before implementation. The empirical analysis provided in
this paper supports these predictions and shows that the changes of baseline consumption tax rates
in the EU countries in recent years have indeed affected the time path of consumer spending.
We utilize a unique micro data set on consumer durables that allows us to observe monthly unit-
sales of individual products and their prices in 22 European countries over the last decade. We
implement a reduced-form specification for sales that tests theoretical predictions of a standard
model of consumer choice under different assumptions about the price pass-through of taxes. To
17For instances, the German household survey (EVS) reports ownership rates for tumbledreyers of 46.5%, for
dishwashers with 68.7% and for washing mashines with 94.4% in 2013.
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Figure 4: DYNAMICS OF SALES: BRANDS AND PRODUCT TYPES
A. Tax Effects on Change of Sales by Brands
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Note: Panel A depicts the estimated coefficients from a extension of the regression for sales in Column
(6) of Table 4 (both not reported). The month of the reform is denoted by zero. In both panels the
shaded area captures the 95% confidence interval based on the robust estimate of the covariance
matrix.
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identify tax effects, we explore how prices and sales of identical products differ in countries with
tax rate changes compared to countries in which tax rates remain constant.
Though the price data clearly supports the full pass-through of consumption taxes into prices, as
typically assumed in the theoretical literature, the results indicate that about a third of the pass-
through takes place pre-reform, more specifically, in the last quarter before implementation and is
completed in the first quarter after implementation. Given the finding of full price pass-through, it
is difficult to explain pre-reform price adjustments with imperfect competition. Robustness checks
also did not detect major differences between the groups of top-sellers or top-brands and other
products. Hence, pre-reform price effects are more likely a consequence of staggered price ad-
justment. Since the price data includes sales and rebates, we cannot preclude that the observed
pre-reform price adjustment simply reflects a decline in the frequency of sales before implementa-
tion. However, recent literature argues that varying frequency of sales is not an important source
of observed price trends.
The empirical findings point to a significant intertemporal effect and confirm an additional tempo-
rary effect of tax changes on the sales of durable goods shortly before the tax-rate changes. Our
analysis also shows that consumer responses differ between reforms even if differences in the im-
plementation lag after announcement are taken into account. More specifically, following the nar-
rative approach to the analysis of fiscal policy and distinguishing reforms by their motivation, we
find that exogenous consumption tax reforms exert stronger pre-reform effects on consumer spend-
ing than endogenous reforms, which are related to current GDP shocks. This seems to contradict
findings of more pronounced effects of fiscal policy in a recessionary economic environment (e.g.,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). However, empirical effects of VAT reforms that take place
in response to GDP shocks may be confounded by the concurrent economic developments. Based
on exogenous tax rate changes, the point estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase
in consumption tax rates causes a drop in sales by about 5 percent and a temporary pre-reform
increase of sales of durables by about 2.5 percent. Although this indicates a relatively strong in-
tertemporal substitution effect of about 2.5 percent, the observed pattern shows a slow recovery of
sales after implementation, which points at substantial, asymmetric adjustment cost. It is likely,
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therefore, that our analysis based on monthly data overstates the long-term effect.
The empirical findings of this paper support the potential of using pre-announced tax increases
as an instrument of fiscal policy. The evidence from numerous VAT rate changes in Europe in
recent years indicates that higher consumption taxes in the future induce a temporary increase in
the demand for durable goods. In terms of the implied annual changes in spending, the estimated
temporary effect is small, however. The sharp and longer drop in sales after a tax increase is
implemented, indicates stronger long-term effects on consumer spending. It also points to the
risks of possible adverse effects on future consumer spending, leading us to conclude that a fiscal
policy using consumption taxes to stimulate consumption spending should be based on a careful
intertemporal policy design.
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A.1 Data Analysis
A.1.1 Data Production
Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK) Retail and Technology GmbH generates the data in the
following way: First, distribution channels are defined, which are relevant for a respective product
group. Examples of distribution channels are hypermarkets, technical superstores, department
stores, etc. An address database is established for all outlets in a given country belonging to a
certain distribution channel with the goal of determining the universe of retailers. This is achieved
through census data and special questionnaires to dealers/retailers. Once the universe is known in
its structure, the sample is drawn through disproportional quota sampling, taking into account three
key factors – region, distribution channel, and turnover class. The aim is to make sure that the data
provides an equally good representation of developments for each product. GfK collects price and
quantity data retailer by retailer. Incoming data from different sources referring to the same product
is translated into one single definite GfK product code. Once checked, the basic data is extrapolated
for each distribution channel. GfK’s data collection, sampling and extrapolation methodology are
described in detail in Fischer (2012), who uses similar data for washing machines from 1995-
2005, at a four-monthly or bi-monthly frequency, to study price convergence in the countries of the
European Monetary Union (EMU).
A.1.2 Data Transformation
Transformations applied to all estimation samples:
The complete untransformed data contains a total of 20,666,643 observations, some of which are
removed. In particular, observations without an identifier (id) are dropped (10,242 obs.), observa-
tions for products for which all units/price variables are missing across all years, and observations
within a product for which all units and prices in a given year are reported as zero (4,932 obs). A
small number of units sold (13,512 obs.) and prices (1,336 obs.) have negative values, which are
3
replaced with missing observations. The negative values likely arise due to returned items. Out of
20,666,643 observations for units sold, 8,341,832 are missing values, and 1,370,799 are zeros. For
prices, 8,901,213 data points are missing and 861,537 are zeros. Usually zero/missing units sold
are coupled with a zero/missing price.
Monthly percentage changes in prices calculated within product-country groups are restricted to
no more than 200% increases and no less that 50% decreases by replacing prices with missing
observations when the percentage change exceeds the specified range. This affects 272,175 obser-
vations (decreases), of which the vast majority, 255,084, are due to a percentage change exactly
equal to -100%, which occurs when a positive price is followed by a price of zero. 17,091 changes
are due to prices falling by more than 50% from one month to the next, while 3,808 prices are re-
placed with missing values because the increase is larger than 200%. This restriction applies to all
descriptive statistics presented in Panels B and C of Table 1. All results are robust to an alternative
transformation, which drops zero prices without imposing any other restriction on the percentage
change. In this case, the mean of ∆ log(PRICE) is -0.005 (0.142) with a min. -11.15 and a max
of 33.57. Further, results remain robust if zero prices are left in the data as they are. Both sets of
results are available upon request.
Due to membership into the EMU, in all estimation samples, data for Slovakia is dropped before
January 1st, 2009 (175,848 obs), for Slovenia – before January 1st, 2007 (65,520 obs.), and for
Estonia all observations after December 2010 are excluded (94,641 obs.). Panel A of Table 1
reports descriptive statistics based on all available data for Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia.
For the purpose of providing descriptive statistics, prices in Table 1 are shown in Euro, calculated
using monthly exchange rates sourced by Eurostat, but all log-changes used in the estimation and
summarized in Table 1 are based on prices in national currencies.
Outliers in ∆ log(UNITS) are present as clearly shown by the min-max range of this variable in
Panels B and C in Table 1. Such outliers arise as a result of two characteristics of the data. First,
543,832 units sold lie in an interval (0,1), with some values as small as 0.0000001, which typically
occurs in the last year a model is in the panel. The log-transformation of such small values results
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in substantial log-changes in units. Our results are robust to the replacement of all such values
with zero (results available upon request). In this case, the mean of ∆ log(UNITS) becomes -
0.016 (0.878) with a minimum of -7.87 and a maximum of 8.89. The maximum value of 8.89
is for a product entering the German market with units sold of 1 in its first month and 7,276 in
the second month. The minimum value is generated by a product that exits the market with sales
of 1 unit in its last month, but 2,626 units in the preceding month. Apart from the (0,1) values,
therefore, outliers in ∆ log(UNITS) arise naturally from the fluctuations in sales at the beginning
and the end of products’ life-cycles.
Transformations applied to estimation sample of Panel B of Table 1
In this estimation sample the data is restricted to models traded in at least two countries at the same
time. This results in the loss of 9,644,145 observations. Refer to Table A-2 for some summary
statistics of the full and the reduced sample. The restriction removes two thirds of all models in the
data, but the remaining 29,683 products on average account for 53% of all units sold and generate
58% of the sales value within a year. Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics only for the
observations that are actually used in the estimations in Tables 2 and 3. The remaining variables in
Panel B are summarized based on the union of sales and price estimation samples.
Transformations applied to estimation sample of Panel C of Table 1
The estimates in Table A-8 are based on the estimation sample described in Panel C of Table
1. This is the sample that incorporates models traded in only one country in the estimation by
collecting, within a product category, all models with an identical set of characteristics into one
group (Table A-4). For example, all built-in, 2-door, freezer-top refrigerators with a no-frost system
belong into one group. A number of models have a single or multiple unknown/non-available
characteristics, which necessitated dropping these models from the data. In total, 39,481 models
(2,207,532 obs.) were removed. 92% of the lost observations stem from two product categories
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– hoods and cooktops, which have numerous models with missing information on the shape of
chimney and heating type characteristics (see Table A-4). We further had to ensure that models in
the resulting products groups-date cells are traded in at least two countries, which resulted in the
loss of 26,217 additional observations. Panel C of Table 1 provides summary statistics only for the
observations that are actually used in the estimation in Table A-8.
Endogenous reforms and reforms announced less than a month before implementation
Seven reforms were announced less than one month before their implementation (see Table A-3
and Figure A-1). To identify observations affected by these reforms, we generated a variable early,
which has a value of unity for all observations in countries undergoing such reforms six months
before and six months after the respective implementation dates. All specifications excluding
relevant models’ observations around the seven reforms are estimated on the condition that early =
0. Endogenous reforms are identified in a similar fashion. We generated a variable endog, which
is set to unity six months before and six months after the implementation dates of all endogenous
reforms listed in Table A-3. Specifications using exogenous reforms are run subject to endog = 0.
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Table A-1: DATA COVERAGE
Country Coverage
AT, BE, CZ, DE, ES, FR,
IT, NL, PL, PT, SE, UK Jan. 2004 - Sept. 2013 for all categories of white goods.
DK Jan. 2004 - Sept. 2013 WM, TD, CO, RG; Jan. 2007 - Sept. 2013 FRZ; Jan. 2008 -
Sept. 2013 HB; HD not covered.
EE, LV, LT Jan. 2006 - Sept. 2013 for WM, CO, RG; Jan. 2008 - Sept. 2013 for HB, DW;
HD,TD, FRZ are not covered.
GR Jan. 2005 - Sept. 2013 for all product categories except TD, which is covered from
Jan. 2007 - Sept. 2013.
FI Jan. 2005 - Sept. 2013 for all product categories, except HD, which is not covered.
HU Jan. 2004 - Sept. 2013 for all product categories except HD, which is covered from
Oct. 2006 - Sept. 2013.
RO Jan. 2009 - Sept. 2013 for all product categories except HD, which is covered from
Jan. 2012 onwards.
SI Jan. 2005 - Sept. 2013 for all product categories except HD, which is covered from
Jan. 2009 - Sept. 2013.
SK Jan. 2006 - Sept. 2013 for all product categories.
Notes: CO=Cooker; DW=Dishwasher; FRZ= Freezer; HB=Hob/Cooktop; HD=Hood; RG= Refrigerator;
TD=Tumble dryer; WM=Washing machine. AT=Austria (5.52); BE=Belgium (5.40); CZ=the Czech Republic
(4.56); DE=Germany (10.01); DK=Denmark (2.88); EE=Estonia (1.27); ES=Spain (7.62); FI=Finland (2.67);
FR=France (9.47); GR=Greece (2.99); HU=Hungary (3.24); IT=Italy (8.25); LV=Latvia (0.96); LT=Lithuania
(1.73); NL=the Netherlands (5.48); PL=Poland (4.87); PT=Portugal (5.02); RO=Romania (1.10); SE=Sweden
(3.84); SI=Slovenia (1.90); SK=Slovakia (2.80); UK=United Kingdom (8.43). Numbers in parentheses after
the country labels are the number of observations associated with the respective country as a percent from total
observations in the dataset.
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Table A-2: FULL SAMPLE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY PRODUCT CATEGORY
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average№ Products per Year
Total, of which: 109,848 3,890 102,879 117,844
Cookers 21,582 503 20,477 22,134
Fridges 24,102 1,359 22,402 26,712
Dishwashers 11,185 1,318 8,745 13,305
Freezers 6,265 416 5,722 7,117
Cooktops 14,006 783 12,572 14,875
Hoods 14,918 1,733 10,810 17,148
Tumble dryers 3,195 196 2,966 3,531
Washing machines 14,877 708 13,855 16,019
Sold in at least 2 countries 29,683 6,466 10,095 36,540
Average№ of Units Sold per Year (Thousands)
Total, of which: 62,408 5,079 47,083 65,712
Cookers 8,623 729 6,252 9,207
Fridges 14,069 1,101 10,708 15,020
Dishwashers 6,784 686 5,401 7,432
Freezers 3,836 381 2,631 4,113
Cooktops 5,920 464 4,691 6,342
Hoods 4,949 433 3,714 5,371
Tumble dryers 3,523 415 2,268 3,942
Washing machines 14,729 1,205 11,416 15,655
Sold in at least 2 countries 33,159 5,906 13,829 38,692
Average Value of Sales per Year (Millions Euro)
Total, of which: 25,987 2,193 19,447 27,883
Cookers 3,908 386 2,740 4,334
Fridges 6,313 538 4,765 6,859
Dishwashers 3,413 302 2,604 3,638
Freezers 1,349 118 976 1,440
Cooktops 2,178 189 1,720 2,337
Hoods 1,245 108 974 1,337
Tumble dryers 1,427 151 1,032 1,598
Washing machines 6,171 498 4,635 6,565
Sold in at least 2 countries 15,187 2,558 6,743 17,389
Product Age
Full sample: 30.5 23.2 1 117
Cookers 30.8 23.4 1 117
Fridges 28.9 21.8 1 117
Dishwashers 27.7 20.7 1 117
Freezers 28.6 22.0 1 117
Cooktops 34.5 25.5 1 117
Hoods 36.9 27.6 1 117
Tumble dryers 29.5 22.0 1 117
Washing machines 27.1 20.3 1 117
Sold in at least 2 countries 31.2 21.8 1 117
Note: The product age shows the average number of months from the earliest date a product enters the market in any
country and the latest date it exits the market in any country in the data.
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Table A-3: STANDARD VAT RATE CHANGES: 2004-2013
Country Announcement Implementation Tax Rationale Classification
Date Date Change
Austria – – – – –
Belgium – – – – –
Czech Republic 26.02.2004 01.05.2004 -0.03 Offsetting,within VAT Endog.
03.03.2009 01.01.2010 0.01 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
02.04.2012 01.01.2013 0.01 Deficit-driven Exog.
Denmark – – – – –
Estonia 18.06.2009 01.07.2009 0.02 Pro-cyclical Endog.
Finland 26.08.2009 01.07.2010 0.01 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
24.03.2012 01.01.2013 0.01 Deficit-driven Exog.
France – – – – –
Germany 12.11.2005 01.01.2007 0.03 Debt-driven Exog.
Greece 29.03.2005 01.04.2005 0.01 Debt-driven Exog.
04.03.2010 15.03.2010 0.02 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
01.05.2010 01.07.2010 0.02 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
Hungary 30.04.2005 01.01.2006 -0.05 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
16.02.2009 01.07.2009 0.05 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
16.09.2011 01.01.2012 0.02 Debt-driven Exog.
Italy 06.09.2011 17.09.2011 0.01 Debt-driven Exog.
Latvia 09.12.2008 01.01.2009 0.03 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
12.06.2009 01.01.2011 0.01 Deficit-driven Exog.
27.04.2012 01.07.2012 -0.01 Long-run growth Exog.
Lithuania 16.12.2008 01.01.2009 0.01 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
23.06.2009 01.09.2009 0.02 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
Netherlands 25.05.2012 01.10.2012 0.02 Debt-driven Exog.
Poland 03.08.2010 01.01.2011 0.01 Debt-driven Exog.
Portugal 25.05.2005 01.07.2005 0.02 Debt-driven Exog.
26.03.2008 01.07.2008 -0.01 GDP-driven, counter-cyclical Endog.
14.05.2010 01.07.2010 0.01 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
29.09.2010 01.01.2011 0.02 Debt-driven Exog.
Romania 06.05.2010 01.07.2010 0.05 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
Slovakia 06.09.2010 01.01.2011 0.01 Deficit-driven Exog.
Slovenia 09.05.2013 01.07.2013 0.02 Long-run growth Exog.
Spain 29.09.2009 01.07.2010 0.02 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
11.07.2012 01.09.2012 0.03 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
Sweden – – – – –
United Kingdom 24.11.2008 01.12.2008 -0.025 GDP-driven, counter-cyclical Endog.
24.11.2008 01.01.2010 0.025 GDP-driven, pro-cyclical Endog.
22.06.2010 04.01.2011 0.025 Debt-driven Exog.
Source: Rates and implementation dates are from Ernst & Young, European Commission, and KPMG. The
announcement dates are either specific dates on which the authorities officially announced the future change in the
standard VAT rate, or the earliest date a change in VAT was mentioned generally in the media. With the exception of
Estonia and Slovenia, the classification and motivation of reforms are taken from Gunter et al. (2017).
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Table A-5: NUMBER OF IDENTIFYING REFORMS BY ORDER OF LEADS
Lead № №
Identifying Identifying
countries reforms
∆τd 17 33
E
[
F1∆τd
]
16 29
E
[
F2∆τd
]
15 26
E
[
F3∆τd
]
12 20
E
[
F4∆τd
]
11 17
E
[
F5∆τd
]
9 12
E
[
F6∆τd
]
7 10
E
[
F7∆τd
]
6 8
E
[
F8∆τd
]
6 8
E
[
F9∆τd
]
6 8
E
[
F10∆τd
]
5 6
E
[
F11∆τd
]
3 3
E
[
F12∆τd
]
2 2
E
[
F13∆τd
]
2 2
E
[
F14∆τd
]
2 2
The table shows the varying number of VAT reforms and
countries captured by higher-order leads of the change in
the tax rate, ∆τd . Due to data limitations for Latvia such as
market size and narrower time and category coverage, we
take the earliest announcement in the data to be that of the
German VAT increase in 2007, which was announced 14
months prior to implementation. For this reason, no more
than 14 leads are considered.
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Table A-6: PRICE EFFECTS: INCREASING NUMBER OF CONTROL COUNTRIES IN
PRODUCT-DATE CELLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
c ≥ 3 c ≥ 4 c ≥ 5 c ≥ 6 c ≥ 7 c ≥ 8
E
[
F3∆τd
]
0.241 0.234 0.240 0.234 0.237 0.250
(0.039) (0.044) (0.048) (0.050) (0.060) (0.067)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
0.046 0.045 0.046 0.059 0.069 0.080
(0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.041) (0.047)
E
[
F1∆τd
]
0.130 0.113 0.111 0.085 0.082 0.089
(0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.043) (0.047) (0.053)
∆τd 0.165 0.184 0.197 0.222 0.263 0.260
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.047)
L1∆τd 0.438 0.443 0.445 0.421 0.412 0.390
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
L2∆τd -0.120 -0.111 -0.088 -0.079 -0.050 -0.039
(0.054) (0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.065)
L3∆τd 0.100 0.115 0.106 0.104 0.083 0.089
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043)
Cumulative Effects
Total pass-through 1.000 1.022 1.057 1.045 1.096 1.119
(0.072) (0.073) (0.080) (0.076) (0.086) (0.100)
Pre-reform 0.416 0.392 0.398 0.378 0.387 0.420
(0.058) (0.059) (0.065) (0.066) (0.071) (0.079)
Post-reform 0.584 0.631 0.660 0.667 0.708 0.700
(0.054) (0.057) (0.061) (0.059) (0.068) (0.077)
N 3,190,634 2,562,872 2,077,872 1,671,169 1,337,784 1,057,569
Product-date effects 912,854 648,451 470,798 341,567 248,367 179,899
Products 42,066 26,809 18,366 12,943 9,274 6,690
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) to (6) are based on data for 22 EU countries. The dependent variable is
the change in the logarithm of price, ∆ log(PRICE). Reforms’ announcement information is fully incorporated.
Observations in countries with reforms announced less than a month before implementation are removed around the
respective reform date. The sample is gradually restricted to products sold contemporaneously in at least 3 up to at
least 8 countries. The monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd
for all reforms that were announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All
specifications include a full set of product-date (id), country and country-month specific fixed effects. The monthly
unemployment rate, Unempl, and the number of months a product appears in the data in a specific country, M.age,
as well as M.age2 are controlled for but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications
and clustered by product category-country
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Table A-7: SALES EFFECTS: INCREASING NUMBER OF CONTROL COUNTRIES IN
PRODUCT-DATE CELLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
c ≥ 3 c ≥ 4 c ≥ 5 c ≥ 6 c ≥ 7 c ≥ 8
E
[
F3∆τd
]
-0.922 -1.112 -1.145 -1.106 -1.233 -0.957
(0.279) (0.303) (0.331) (0.364) (0.406) (0.456)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
-0.689 -0.644 -0.768 -0.775 -1.008 -1.034
(0.244) (0.263) (0.286) (0.313) (0.347) (0.388)
E
[
F1∆τd
]
2.794 2.924 2.967 3.081 3.382 3.508
(0.240) (0.259) (0.281) (0.308) (0.341) (0.381)
∆τd -4.635 -4.799 -4.789 -4.723 -4.674 -4.394
(0.238) (0.255) (0.275) (0.299) (0.330) (0.367)
L1∆τd -1.655 -1.924 -2.143 -2.306 -2.287 -2.216
(0.239) (0.257) (0.278) (0.303) (0.335) (0.372)
L2∆τd -0.419 -0.365 -0.284 -0.169 -0.383 -0.193
(0.240) (0.258) (0.278) (0.303) (0.334) (0.371)
L3∆τd 1.172 0.989 0.850 0.917 0.842 0.712
(0.241) (0.259) (0.280) (0.306) (0.338) (0.376)
Cumulative Effects
Total -4.353 -4.931 -5.311 -5.080 -5.362 -4.573
(0.659) (0.709) (0.769) (0.842) (0.933) (1.041)
Pre-reform 1.183 1.168 1.054 1.200 1.141 1.518
(0.445) (0.480) (0.522) (0.573) (0.637) (0.713)
Post-reform -5.536 -6.095 -6.366 -6.281 -6.503 -6.091
(0.484) (0.520) (0.561) (0.612) (0.676) (0.751)
N 3,255,452 2,611,985 2,115,467 1,700,080 1,359,930 1,074,686
Product-date effects 927,440 656,984 475,835 344,538 250,059 180,918
Products 42,298 26,897 18,400 12,963 9,281 6,693
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) to (6) are based on data for 22 EU countries. The dependent variable is
the change in the logarithm of sales, ∆ log(UNITS). Reforms’ announcement information is fully incorporated.
Observations in countries with reforms announced less than a month before implementation are removed around the
respective reform date. The sample is gradually restricted to products sold contemporaneously in at least 3 up to at
least 8 countries. The monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd
for all reforms that were announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All
specifications include a full set of product-date, country and country-month specific fixed effects. The monthly
unemployment rate, Unempl, and the number of months a products appears in the data in a specific country, M.age,
as well as M.age2 are controlled for but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications
and clustered by product category-country
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Table A-8: SALES EFFECTS: INCLUDING SINGLE COUNTRY PRODUCTS
Reforms All All n≥ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F3∆τd -0.357
(0.286)
F2∆τd -0.346
(0.271)
F1∆τd 1.897 1.874
(0.267) (0.267)
E
[
F3∆τd
]
-0.311 -0.402
(0.309) (0.315)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
-0.536 -0.641
(0.278) (0.274)
E
[
F1∆τd
]
2.014 1.987 2.050 2.043
(0.291) (0.290) (0.300) (0.299)
∆τd -3.426 -3.433 -3.428 -3.436 -3.941 -3.957
(0.529) (0.530) (0.529) (0.530) (0.538) (0.539)
L1∆τd -1.775 -1.759 -1.773 -1.764 -1.379 -1.372
(0.295) (0.293) (0.295) (0.295) (0.298) (0.298)
L2∆τd -0.774 -0.770 -0.995
(0.249) (0.249) (0.258)
L3∆τd 1.116 1.115 1.324
(0.232) (0.231) (0.225)
Cumulative Effects
Total -3.304 -3.678 -3.187 -3.715 -3.270 -3.999
(0.316) (0.455) (0.300) (0.478) (0.319) (0.409)
Pre-reform 1.897 1.172 2.014 1.140 2.050 1.000
(0.267) (0.433) (0.291) (0.455) (0.300) (0.440)
Post-reform -5.201 -4.849 -5.201 -4.855 -5.320 -5.000
(0.429) (0.450) (0.428) (0.450) (0.449) (0.456)
N 7,784,370 7,784,370 7,784,370 7,784,370 7,579,291 7,579,291
Group-date effects 44,457 44,457 44,457 44,457 44,062 44,062
Products 236,743 236,743 236,743 236,743 234,265 234,265
Notes: Regressions are based on data for 22 EU countries. The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm
of sales, ∆ log(UNITS). Estimates in columns (5) to (6) are based on a reduced sample, in which observations
in countries with reforms announced less than a month before implementation, are removed around the respective
reform date. The monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd
for all reforms that were announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j.All
specifications include a full set of country-, country-month specific and group-date-specific fixed effects, where the
groups are based on all possible combinations of the characteristics per product category as shown in Table A-4.
Group-date cells, which contain a single country, are dropped from the estimation. The monthly unemployment rate,
Unempl, and the number of months a product appears in the data in a specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2
are controlled for but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by
group-date cells.
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Table A-9: DIFFERENTIAL SALES AND PRICE EFFECTS FOR TOP-SELLING PRODUCTS
Forward terms Fi∆τd E
[
Fi∆τd
]
Reforms All All n ≥ 1
(1) (2) (3)
Price effects R50
Total 0.592 0.349 0.217
(0.120) (0.121) (0.125)
Pre-reform 0.375 0.132 0.130
(0.077) (0.078) (0.080)
Post-reform 0.217 0.217 0.086
(0.093) (0.093) (0.095)
Price effects R100
Total 0.611 0.342 0.215
(0.102) (0.110) (0.114)
Pre-reform 0.412 0.143 0.123
(0.059) (0.072) (0.074)
Post-reform 0.199 0.199 0.092
(0.083) (0.083) (0.086)
N 4,033,450 4,033,450 3,917,656
Product-date effects 1,303,336 1,303,336 1,276,343
Products 71,237 71,237 70,677
Sales effects R50
Total -1.06 -0.835 -0.083
(1.17) (1.18) (1.23)
Pre-reform -0.306 -0.081 -0.012
(0.780) (0.798) (0.821)
Post-reform -0.753 -0.754 -0.070
(0.870) (0.870) (0.908)
Sales effects R100
Total -0.679 -0.559 -0.558
(0.977) (1.07) (1.11)
Pre-reform -0.461 -0.337 -0.521
(0.576) (0.717) (0.739)
Post-reform -0.218 -0.222 -0.037
(0.788) (0.788) (0.823)
N 4,127,049 4,127,049 4,006,331
Product-date effects 1,331,295 1,331,295 1,302,878
Products 72,057 72,057 71,493
Notes: The table shows regressions for sales and prices following eq. (5.1) and (5.2), with a full set of interaction
terms for ∆τd with indicators R50 (R100). The latter denote dummy variables equal to one if a product reaches a top
50 (top 100) rank within its respective category at some point in its life-cycle. The table reports the cumulative sum
of pre-reform and post-reform coefficients as well as the total effect only for the interaction terms. In other words,
it focuses solely on the differential effect for top-sellers and other goods. The monthly change in the standard VAT
rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
Fi∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd for all reforms that were announced n > j periods ahead,
and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All specifications include a full set of product-date, country
and country-month specific fixed effects. The monthly unemployment rate, Unempl, and the number of months a
products appears in the data in a specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2 are controlled for but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by product-date cells.
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Table A-10: SALES EFFECTS: BRAND DIFFERENTIATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subsample Top Mid Low
E
[
F3∆τd
]
-1.183 -1.327 -1.651 -1.735 -0.308
(0.552) (0.517) (0.493) (0.810) (0.673)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
-0.227 -0.318 0.732 -1.255 -0.450
(0.474) (0.508) (0.673) (0.627) (0.632)
E
[
F1∆τd
]
2.182 2.249 2.981 2.395 0.976
(0.504) (0.515) (0.670) (0.612) (0.942)
∆τd -4.110 -4.140 -5.713 -4.051 -1.827
(0.582) (0.529) (0.728) (0.361) (0.856)
L1∆τd -1.199 -1.441 -2.164 -1.220 -0.716
(0.377) (0.359) (0.539) (0.404) (0.740)
L2∆τd -0.471 -0.206 -0.428 -0.301 0.269
(0.402) (0.388) (0.754) (0.531) (0.550)
L3∆τd 1.477 1.319 0.481 2.075 1.576
(0.446) (0.448) (0.600) (0.649) (0.756)
Cumulative Effects
Total -3.532 -3.862 -5.762 -4.093 -0.479
(0.770) (0.729) (1.489) (1.030) (1.228)
Pre-reform 0.771 0.605 2.061 -0.595 0.218
(0.747) (0.709) (0.841) (1.102) (1.195)
Post-reform -4.304 -4.467 -7.824 -3.498 -0.698
(0.620) (0.636) (1.100) (0.774) (1.171)
N 2,090,542 1,481,867 685,218 475,306 321,343
Product-date effects 644,210 390,977 176,295 134,972 79,710
Products 34,216 16,668 7,106 6,145 3,417
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) to (5) are based on data for 22 EU countries and three type of products:
refrigerators, washing machines, and freezers. The list of top brands includes 32 brands, with Liebherr, Bosch,
Siemens, AEG. Miele, Samsung, LG and Neff covering 92% of top-brands’ observations. 24 brands are classified
as medium-level, of which Whirlpool, Electrolux, Gorenje, Hotpoint-Ariston, Bauknecht, Tradebrand, and Fagor
cover 91% of all observations. The list of lower-level brands is composed of 76 brands, with 92% of all observations
accounted for by Candy, Indesit, Zanussi, Beko, Exquisit, Ardo, and Severin. The dependent variable is the change
in the logarithm of sales, ∆ log(UNITS). Reforms’ announcement information is fully incorporated. The monthly
change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd for all reforms that were
announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms announced n ≤ j. All specifications include
a set of product-date (id), country and country-month specific fixed effects. The monthly unemployment rate,
Unempl, and the number of months a product appears in the data in a specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2
are controlled for but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in all specifications and clustered by
product category-country
.
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Table A-11: PRICE EFFECTS: BRAND DIFFERENTIATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subsample Top Mid Low
E
[
F3∆τd
]
0.150 0.146 0.066 0.260 0.087
(0.047) (0.047) (0.081) (0.044) (0.085)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
0.041 0.026 -0.034 0.048 0.082
(0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.045) (0.066)
E
[
F1∆τd
]
0.123 0.139 0.168 0.115 0.134
(0.051) (0.052) (0.084) (0.065) (0.059)
∆τd 0.241 0.223 0.174 0.232 0.285
(0.073) (0.072) (0.067) (0.103) (0.087)
L1∆τd 0.404 0.430 0.464 0.413 0.398
(0.051) (0.049) (0.077) (0.061) (0.080)
L2∆τd -0.110 -0.121 -0.073 -0.146 -0.155
(0.069) (0.071) (0.075) (0.103) (0.072)
L3∆τd -0.000 0.018 0.095 0.042 -0.123
(0.047) (0.048) (0.069) (0.059) (0.094)
Cumulative Effects
Total pass-through 0.849 0.862 0.861 0.964 0.710
(0.101) (0.096) (0.132) (0.119) (0.150)
Pre-reform 0.314 0.312 0.201 0.422 0.304
(0.079) (0.082) (0.115) (0.100) (0.103)
Post-reform 0.535 0.550 0.660 0.541 0.406
(0.090) (0.092) (0.114) (0.115) (0.155)
Pass-through F(1) 2.20 2.07 1.11 0.09 3.72
N 2,045,318 1,450,514 667,930 466,099 316,485
Product-date effects 631,443 383,624 172,368 132,561 78,695
Products 33,877 16,575 7,054 6,118 3,403
Notes: Regression results in columns (1) to (6) are based on data for 22 EU countries. The list of top brands includes
32 brands, with Liebherr, Bosch, Siemens, AEG. Miele, Samsung, LG and Neff covering 92% of top-brands’
observations. 24 brands are classified as medium-level, of which Whirlpool, Electrolux, Gorenje, Hotpoint-Ariston,
Bauknecht, Tradebrand, and Fagor cover 91% of all observations. The list of lower-level brands is composed of 76
brands, with 92% of all observations accounted for by Candy, Indesit, Zanussi, Beko, Exquisit, Ardo, and Severin.
The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of price, ∆ log(PRICE). Reforms’ announcement information
is fully incorporated. Observations in countries with reforms announced less than a month before implementation are
removed around the respective reform date. The sample is gradually restricted to products sold contemporaneously
in at least 3 up to at least 8 countries. The monthly change in the standard VAT rate is denoted by ∆τd . Note that
E
[
F j∆τd
]
= Fn∆τd for all reforms that were announced n > j periods ahead, and E
[
F j∆τd
]
= 0 for reforms
announced n ≤ j. All specifications include a full set of product-date (id), country and country-month specific fixed
effects. The monthly unemployment rate, Unempl, and the number of months a product appears in the data in a
specific country, M.age, as well as M.age2 are controlled for but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust in all specifications and clustered by product category-country
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Table A-12: SALES RESPONSES: PRODUCT CATEGORIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fridges Washing M. Dishwasher Tumbledr. Freezer Hob, Hoods
Cookers
E
[
F3∆τd
]
-1.363 -0.731 -0.469 -1.172 -1.466 -0.343
(0.856) (0.468) (0.705) (2.194) (1.360) (0.629)
E
[
F2∆τd
]
-0.242 -0.695 -1.227 -2.029 0.785 0.147
(0.751) (0.406) (0.702) (1.462) (1.460) (0.521)
E [F∆τd] 2.806 0.949 3.254 4.743 2.651 1.881
(0.715) (0.405) (0.672) (1.375) (1.091) (0.699)
∆τd -4.177 -3.807 -4.756 -6.609 -4.580 -4.415
(0.895) (0.749) (0.833) (1.255) (1.756) (1.007)
L∆τd -0.854 -1.404 -1.700 -2.511 -2.168 -2.613
(0.623) (0.453) (0.708) (1.677) (0.860) (0.820)
L2∆τd -0.654 -0.454 -0.548 -0.535 0.012 -0.252
(0.631) (0.602) (1.074) (1.517) (1.031) (0.475)
L3∆τd 1.904 1.092 0.586 -1.341 0.686 1.208
(0.713) (0.618) (0.751) (1.295) (1.003) (0.515)
Cumulative Effects
Total -2.580 -5.051 -4.861 -9.453 -4.080 -4.387
(1.220) (0.793) (1.217) (2.751) (2.590) (1.296)
Pre-reform 1.202 -0.478 1.557 1.542 1.970 1.685
(1.228) (0.701) (1.261) (3.645) (2.354) (0.747)
Post-reform -3.782 -4.573 -6.419 -10.995 -6.050 -6.071
(0.888) (0.834) (0.926) (1.913) (1.723) (1.193)
N 1,176,352 601,355 612,129 156,767 312,835 1,267,322
Product-date effects 353,643 198,594 199,056 48,344 91,973 439,544
Products 72,056 72,056 72,056 72,056 71,492 71,492
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Figure A-1: TIME BETWEEN ANNOUNCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
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Note: The graph shows the length of the period between announcement and implementation
measured in days and scaled by the total number of days in a year for the 33 VAT reforms sum-
marized in Table A-3. The solid horizontal line depicts the median time between announcement
and implementation, which is a little over a quarter of a year. All reforms below the dashed line
were announced less than a month before their enactment.
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Figure A-2: GERMANY: NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ADDRESSING REFORM,
2005-2007
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Note: The figure depicts the number of articles in four major German newspapers, which men-
tion “VAT rise" either in the title, or the main text from January 2005 until December 2007.
Authors’ calculations using the online archives of Der Spiegel, Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung. The search keyword is “VAT rise" (“Mehrwertsteuer-
erhöhung"). Germany increased the standard VAT rate from 16 to 19% on 1.1.2007, with the tax
increase officially announced in November 2005.
Figure A-3: SPAIN: NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ADDRESSING REFORMS, 2008-
2013
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Note: The figure shows the number of articles in three major Spanish newspapers, which men-
tion “VAT rise" either in the title, or the main text from January 2008 until September 2013.
Authors’ calculations using the online archives of La Razon, El Mundo, and El Correo. The
search keyword is “VAT rise" (“subida de IVA"). Spain increased the standard VAT rate twice in
the depicted period: from 16 to 18% on 1.7.2010, with the tax increase officially announced in
September 2009, and from 18 to 21% on 1.9.2012, announced on 11.7.2012.
Figure A-4: GROWTH RATE OF SALES AND PRICES
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Note: The figure depicts the annual growth rate of sales and prices in Germany and Spain relative
to the same month of the previous year, starting from January 2004 and ending in September
2013. Germany increased the standard VAT rate from 16 to 19% on 1.1.2007, with the tax
increase officially announced in November 2005. Spain increased the standard VAT rate twice in
the depicted period: from 16 to 18% on 1.7.2010, with the tax increase officially announced in
September 2009, and from 18 to 21% on 1.9.2012, announced on 11.7.2012.
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Figure A-5: GERMANY: GROWTH RATE OF WHITE GOODS’ SALES BY
PRODUCT CATEGORY, 2005-2007
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Note: The figure depicts the growth rate of the number of units sold in month m in years 2005, 2006,
and 2007 relative to the average sales in 2004 and 2008 for the same month m for eight categories
of durable goods: refrigerators (RG), cookers (CO), hobs/cooktops (HB), hoods (HD), dishwashers
(DW), freezers (FRZ), tumble driers (TD) and washing machines (WM). The aggregate growth rate
is depicted in two different ways in Figures A-4 and A-6. Germany increased the standard VAT rate
from 16 to 19% on 1.1.2007, with the tax increase officially announced in November 2005.
Figure A-6: GERMANY: GROWTH RATE OF SALES
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Note: The figure depicts the growth rate of the total number of units sold in Germany. The upper
panel shows the growth rate in month m in years 2005, 2006, and 2007 relative to the average sales
in 2004 and 2008 in the same month m. For example, sales in Dec. 2005 were 16% higher relative to
the average sales in Dec. 2004 and Dec. 2008. The black dashed line depicts the same growth rate
excluding HB, HD, and CO. The dashed line is the growth rate of units sold in Austria, where no VAT
rate change occurred.
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B.1 Demand for Consumer Durables with Preannounced Tax Rate Change
This appendix provides a theoretical analysis of the demand for a consumer durable good by a
household facing a pre-announced change in a general consumption tax. The following section
characterizes the houshold’s optimization problem. Subsequently, section B.3 derives Euler equa-
tions, i.e. the optimal time path of consumption of durable and non-durable goods. Section B.4
derives empirical predictions. This discussion explores in particular the role of the household’s
adjustment cost and of staggered price adjustment.
B.2 Household Objective and Budget Constraint
The household derives utility from the consumption of durable and non-durable goods. The intra-
period utility function is
us =
[
(1 − b) 1 x −1s + b 1 k
−1

s
] 
−1
,
where xs is current consumption of non-durable goods and ks indicates the consumption of services
from the stock of consumer durables in the same period,  denotes the elasticity of substitution.
Since the analysis deals with pre-announced changes in the tax rate, the consumer’s choice is
analyzed in a setting of certainty. The present value of the instantaneous utility in all periods is
∑
s=t
βs−t
σ
σ − 1u
1− 1σ
s ,
where β < 1 is a discount factor reflecting the household’s time preference, and σ is the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. Note that in the specific case, where σ =  , the utility function
becomes additively separable in durable and non-durable goods consumption.
The stock of consumer durables evolves according to
ks − ks−1 = is − δks−1.
2
where δ is the rate of depreciation. Writing d = 1 − δ, we can solve for gross investment
is = ks − ks−1d. (B.1)
Following standard practice we assume convex adjustment cost, formally
c
2
(ks − ks−1)2 .
Note that, for simplicity, we assume that adjustment cost only arises with net-investment and not
with replacement investment.18 Normalizing the pre-tax price of non-durables to unity and setting
the pre-tax price of the durable good to qs, consumer prices for durable and non-durable goods are
ps = (1 + τs) qs and (1 + τs) ,
respectively.
The evolution of (financial) wealth is determined by total income, which consists of labor income
ws, and interest income net of current purchases of non-durable consumption goods and current
investment in durable goods
as+1 − as = ws + ras − (1 + τs) xs − (1 + τs) qs (ks − ks−1d) − c2 (ks − ks−1)
2 , (B.2)
where as is the stock of wealth at the beginning of period s, and r is the interest rate.
B.3 Demand for Consumer-Durables
In each period s, the household chooses consumption of non-durables xs and of durables ks to
maximize expected discounted utility subject to constraint (B.2). Eliminating is by plugging (B.1)
18Similar results would be obtained if adjustment cost is associated with gross investment (ks −dks−1) as in Shapiro
(1986).
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into (B.2), the consumer chooses xs and ks .19 The first order conditions for consumption of non-
durables and durables are
u
− 1σ
s
∂us
∂xs
− λs+1 (1 + τs) != 0,(B.1)
u
− 1σ
s
∂us
∂ks
− λs+1 (1 + τs) qs + λs+2dβ (1 + τs+1) qs+1 − λs+1c (ks − ks−1) + λs+2 βc (ks+1 − ks) != 0.(B.2)
where λs+1 represents the marginal utility of income. With the simplifying assumption that β (1 + r) =
1, the Euler equation for the wealth simplifies to λt+2λs+1 = 1.
The optimal consumption structure obeys
ks
xs
=
b
1 − b (Qs + Cs)
− . (B.3)
Qs denotes the user cost of the service flow of the durable good (Ogaki and Reinhard, 1998). Cs
denotes the marginal adjustment cost. Basically, if  > 0, equation (B.3) states that a reduction in
the user cost and a decline in the adjustment cost is associated with a substitution of non-durable
with durable-goods. The user cost is defined as
Qs =
[
1 − ρd
(
ps+1
ps
)]
qs,
where ρ = 11+r and d = 1 − δ. Note that the user cost depends on the change in the consumer price
in the next period ( ps+1ps =
1+τs+1
1+τs
qs+1
qs
). The user cost of consumer durables declines in period s if
the consumer price increases in s + 1. There are two components of this change. One component
is the change in the pre-tax price. The second component is the change in the tax rate. Cs denotes
19 The Lagrangian for the intertemporal optimization problem is
L =
∞∑
s=t
{
βs−t
σ
σ − 1u
1− 1σ
s + λs+1 β
s−t
[
(1 + r) as + ws − (1 + τs ) xs − (1 + τs ) qs (ks − ks−1d) − c2 (ks − ks−1)
2 − as+1
] }
,
where λs+1 is the Lagrange multiplier in current value terms.
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the marginal adjustment cost
Cs =
c
1 + τs
[
(ks − ks−1) − β (ks+1 − ks)] .
In order to derive implications for the demand for durable goods, we first consider the time path
of consumption of non-durables. From the first-order condition (B.1) and noting that λs+2 = λs+1,
the optimal time-path of consumption of non-durables obeys
u
1
 − 1σ
s+1 x
− 1
s+1 =
(
1 + τs+1
1 + τs
)
u
1
 − 1σ
s x
− 1
s . (B.4)
To simplify this expression, we decompose utility
us = xsFs, where Fs =

(1 − b) 1 + b 1
(
ks
xs
) −1
 

−1
.
Fs is the utility per unit of non-durable goods. If we insert the optimum relationship (B.3), we can
express the latter by Fs = (1 − b) 1−1
[
1 + b1−b (Qs + Cs)
1− ] −1 . If replace us and us+1 in equation
(B.4) we obtain the Euler-equation for consumption of non-durables
xs+1 = xs
(
1 + τs+1
1 + τs
)−σ 

1 + b1−b (Qs+1 + Cs+1)
1−
1 + b1−b (Qs + Cs)
1−


σ−
−1
.
If we log-linearize this equation around the initial steady state, the change in the deviation of
consumption from the steady state is
xs+1 − x0
x0
− xs − x0
x0
= −σ
(
τs+1 − τs
1 + τ0
)
− (σ −  ) ϕ
(
Qs+1 + Cs+1 − Qs − Cs
Q0 + C0
)
, (B.5)
with
ϕ =
b
1−b (Q0 + C0)
1−
1 + b1−b (Q0 + C0)
1− .
Q0 denotes the user cost in the steady state, which is determined by the interest and depreciation
5
rates Q0 = (1 − ρd) q. C0 denotes the marginal adjustment cost in the steady state, which is zero
if adjustment cost is a function of net-investment. 20
B.4 Effects of a Tax Rate Change
Abstracting from adjustment cost, equation (B.5) suggests that there are two effects of taxes on the
optimal consumption path. First, there is an effect associated with intertemporal substitution. If the
tax rate is changed, say it is increased at a specific date, consumption is changed increased before
and future consumption after the tax increase is reduced. The strength of this effect increases
with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Second, there is an effect associated with the
user cost of durables. If the tax rate increases in period t + 1 relative to period t, the user cost of
durables declines temporarily Qt+1−Qt < 0. If the two types of consumption goods are substitutes,
 > 0, this provides an incentive to substitute the consumption of non-durable goods with durable
goods. How this affects the time path of consumption of non-durables depends on the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution. If it is small, σ >  , this effect will further contribute to an increase of
consumer spending. If the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is large, σ <  , the intratemporal
substitution of non-durable with durable goods is so strong that it works against an increase in
spending on non-durables. In the case of separable utility σ =  , the time path would only be
affected by intertemporal substitution effects (Cashin and Unayama, 2016).
Inserting from equation (B.3), we can use (B.5) to derive the Euler equation for the capital stock
ks+1 = ks
(
Qs+1 + Cs+1
Qs + Cs
)− (1 + τs+1
1 + τs
)−σ 

1 + b1−b (Qs+1 + Cs+1)
1−
1 + b1−b (Qs + Cs)
1−


σ−
−1
. (B.1)
20If the cost function is related to gross investment, the steady state adjustment cost is just reflecting the replacement
investment C0 =
δk0
1+τ0
Q0
q .
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Taking logs and using a first-order Taylor approximation, we can approximate equation (B.1) by
ks+1 − k0
k0
− ks − k0
k0
= −σ
(
τs+1 − τs
1 + τ0
)
−

 + (σ −  ) ϕ︸           ︷︷           ︸
γ


(
Qs+1 + Cs+1 − Qs − Cs
Q0 + C0
)
.(B.2)
Equation (B.2) shows that, as in the case of non-durables, two effects determine the influence of
taxes on the time-path of the stock of durables. First, there is intertemporal substitution. Suppose
the tax rate increases, all consumption including consumption of durables is increased today and
future consumption is reduced. Second, there is an effect associated with the user cost of durables.
In contrast to the time path of non-durables, the effect of the user cost on the time path of durables is
unambiguous. If the tax rate increases in period t+1, the user cost of durables declines temporarily
Qt − Qt−1 < 0, and, ceteris paribus, consumption of durable goods in period t is expanded. This
holds regardless of how large the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is. Even if the utility
function is separable in consumption of durable and non-durable goods σ =  , the decline in the
user cost contributes to a pre-reform expansion of the stock of durables. In the period t + 1, the
user cost of durables reverts to the initial level and Qt+1 − Qt > 0. This contributes to a decline in
the stock of capital.
The marginal cost of adjustment on the right-hand side of equation (B.2) is a function of the
changes in the capital stock. It can be approximated by
Cs+1 =
ck0
1 + τ0
[
ks+1 − k0
k0
− ks − k0
k0
]
− β ck0
1 + τ0
[
ks+2 − k0
k0
− ks+1 − k0
k0
]
. (B.3)
Since Cs+1 is affected by the change in the capital stock in the subsequent period s + 2 and since
Cs is affected by the change in the capital stock in period s, the system (B.2) and (B.3) defines a
higher order difference equation in the capital stock.
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B.4.1 Tax Effects in Absence of Adjustment Cost
To discuss the model predictions, consider a log-linear approximation of the user cost
Qs − Q0
Q0
=
qs − q0
q0
− α
[
ps+1 − p0
p0
− ps − p0
p0
]
,
where α = βd1−βd , If pre-tax prices are constant
Qs − Q0
Q0
= −ατs+1 − τs
1 + τ0
.
If the initial tax rate is zero
Qs − Q0
Q0
= −α∆τs+1.
Since the user cost is a function of the tax rate change we can characterize the investment response
as a closed form solution of tax rate changes. From equation (B.2)
∆ log is+1 =
1
δ
[
−σ∆τs+1 − γQs+1 − Q0Q0 + γ
Qs − Q0
Q0
]
−d
δ
[
−σ∆τs − γQs − Q0Q0 + γ
Qs−1 − Q0
Q0
]
.
Inserting for Qs−Q0Q0 gives
∆ log is+1 = −σ
δ
∆τs+1 +
αγ
δ
∆τs+2 − αγ
δ
∆τs+1
dσ
δ
∆τs − dαγ
δ
∆τs+1 +
dαγ
δ
∆τs
This implies that the log change in investment is determined by tax rates changes including lagged
and forward terms
∆ log is+1 =
[
αγ
δ
]
∆τs+2 −
[
σ
δ
+
αγ
δ
+
dαγ
δ
]
∆τs+1 +
[
dσ
δ
+
dαγ
δ
]
∆τs . (B.4)
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This indicates that without adjustment cost and price effects, the change in investment is a function
of current, future and lagged tax rate changes. Note that the sum of bracketed terms is
−σ =
[
αγ
δ
]
−
[
σ
δ
+
αγ
δ
+
dαγ
δ
]
+
[
dσ
δ
+
dαγ
δ
]
.
Hence, the absolute value of the sum of the tax effects is approximately equal to the intertemporal
substitution elasticity.
The time path is depicted in Figure B-1. It shows results from a numerical solution of the adjust-
ment path.21 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to σ = 0.21 following Cashin and
Unayama (2016). The elasticity of intratemporal subsitution  = 0.18 is taken from Pakos (2011).
The monthly rate of interest r is set to 0.0025 equivalent to an annual rate of 3%, the monthly de-
preciation is set to 0.022 corresponding to an annual depreciation rate of 0.23 (see Cashin, 2017).
b is set to 0.25 to match the actual spending share for consumer durables in the European Union in
2016.22
Without adjustment cost, investment increases in the month before the tax-rate increase by 1 per-
centage point. Note that the response is quite strong, given that the tax rate is supposed to increase
by only 1 percentage point. However, owing to the small elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
the sum of all changes in the houshehold’s purchases of durables is only about -0.21%.
B.4.2 Tax Effects with Symmetric Adjustment Cost
In the presence of symmetric adjustment cost, if the capital stock is constant in all periods except
immediately before and after a tax rate increase, the marginal adjustment cost Cs will deviate from
21We use Dynare 4.5.7. in Matlab R2018b.
22Final consumption expenditure of households by consumption purpose (COICOP 3 digit), Source: Eurostat.
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Figure B-1: Investment around Tax Increase: No Adjustment Cost
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Note: The figure depicts a numerical solution of the adjustment given a tax increase by 1 percentage point in period
10. Preference parameters are σ = 0.21 and  = 0.18. Adjustment cost is zero. The monthly rate of interest r is
set to 0.0025 equivalent to an annual rate of 3%, the monthly depreciation is set to 0.022 corresponding to an annual
depreciation rate of 0.23, b is set to 0.25.
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zero in periods t − 1, t and t + 1. More specifically, from equation (B.5)
Ct−1 = − ck01 + τ0 β
kt − kt−1
k0
Ct =
ck0
1 + τ0
[
kt − kt−1
k0
+ β
kt − kt+1
k0
]
Ct+1 = − ck01 + τ0
kt − kt+1
k0
.
This implies that
Ct−1 − Ct−2 < 0
Ct − Ct−1 > 0
Ct+1 − Ct < 0
Ct+2 − Ct+1 > 0.
According to equation (B.2), Ct − Ct−1 > 0 works against the decline in the user cost and thus
mitigates the increase in the capital stock in period t. Ct−1 − Ct−2 < 0, however, implies that the
capital stock starts to increase already in t − 1. Thus adjustment cost provide the consumer with
an incentive not to wait for the last month t with low taxes and start with higher purchases already
in t − 1. Ct+1 − Ct < 0 mitigates the drop in the capital stock which results from Qt+1 − Qt < 0.
However, Ct+2 − Ct+1 > 0 implies that the capital stock still declines in period t + 2. Thus, the
adjustment cost provides an incentive to postpone the recovery in the capital stock for a later period.
This intuition is confirmed by a numerical solution of the adjustment path (see Figure B-2). The
adjustment cost parameter c is set to 0.09 (Cashin, 2017). With adjustment cost, the increase in
investment is much weaker than above. The time path also shows that investment starts to increase
before the last month at low tax rates. However, the total effect on sales remains small, pointing to
a long term decline of spending for durable of about -0.24%.
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Figure B-2: Investment around Tax Increase: Symmetric Adjustment Cost
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Note: Note: The figure depicts a numerical solution of the adjustment given a tax increase by 1 percentage point in
period 10. Adjustment cost is symmetric with parameter c = 0.09. All other parameters the same as those used for
Figure B-1, i.e. σ = 0.21,  = 0.18, r = 0.0025, monthly depreciation of to 0.022, b = 0.25.
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B.4.3 Tax Effects with Asymmetric Adjustment Cost
The literature has discussed various alternative specifications for the adjustment cost including
asymmetry adjustment cost, that differs depending on whether capital grows or declines ( ... refer-
ence needed ...). Formally,
(ks − ks−1)2 c+2 , if ks > ks−1, c+ > 0
(ks − ks−1)2 c−2 , if ks < ks−1, c− > 0
0 if ks = ks−1.
In this case, the marginal adjustment cost term Cs is
Cs =
c+
1 + τs
I [ks − ks−1] (ks − ks−1) + c
−
1 + τs
I [ks−1 − ks] (ks − ks−1) (B.5)
− βc
+
1 + τs
I [ks+1 − ks] (ks+1 − ks) − βc
−
1 + τs
I [ks − ks+1] (ks+1 − ks) ,
where I [x] has unit value if x > 0 and is zero, otherwise. In the steady state, marginal adjustment
cost is zero, as above.
The implication is shown by another numerical solution of the adjustment path (see Figure B-
3). While the adjustment cost parameter for an increase in the stock of capital is unchanged, the
downward adjustment is assumed to be associated with larger adjustment cost (c+ < c−). As
the figure shows, the increase in investment is smaller than with symmetric adjustment cost and
the recovery of investment takes more time and a longer time period is required to estimate the
long-term effect on the purchases of durables.
B.4.4 Tax Effects with Staggered Price Adjustment
Depending on how the pre-tax price changes over the course of a tax increase, however, the user
cost is not only affected by tax rate change and adjustment cost. To explore the implications, we
13
Figure B-3: Investment around Tax Increase: Asymmetric Adjustment Cost
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Note: Note: The figure depicts a numerical solution of the adjustment given a tax increase by 1 percentage point in
period 10. Adjustment cost is asymmetric with c+ = 0.09 and c− = 0.59. All other parameters the same as those used
for Figure B-1, i.e. σ = 0.21,  = 0.18, r = 0.0025, monthly depreciation of to 0.022, b = 0.25.
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consider a scenario, where the retailer displays staggered price adjustment. More specifically, we
assume that the retailer facing a tax increase by 1 percentag point, raises the price in three steps
rather than in one. The retail price increases already in the last month before the tax rate change,
and full price pass through is reached one month after the tax rate change.
What is the intuition for the effect on the investment path? The retailer’s price increase mitigates
the decline in the user cost before the tax rate increases. At the same time, it implies that the user
cost declines already in period t-1. Thus, the pre-retail price effects provide the consumer with an
incentive not to wait for the last month to start with higher purchases. Moreover, as the tax increase
is not fully shifted to the consumer in period t + 1, the user cost will not fully recover in period
t + 1. This mitigates the drop in demand in period t + 1.
This intuition is confirmed by the numerical solution of the adjustment path (see Figure B-4). The
figure depicts the adjustment path obtained with symmetric adjustment cost under the assumption
that the retailer increases the price by 0.25% in the last month before the tax rate increases by 1%
point. In the first month with the higher tax rate, the retailer is assumed to give a pre-tax discount
by 0.25%. As depicted in the lower panel, the consumer price is 0.25% higher than the initial price
in the period before the tax increase. It is about 0.75% higher in the first month with the higher tax
rate. In the second month after the reform, the price is 1% higher than the initial price, such that
there full pass-through.
Interestingly, the small price increase is quite effective in curtailing the strong investment demand
in period t. Actually, in period t − 1 the investment increase is even higher. After the tax increase,
investment drops less. While investment spending continues to be below the steady state level,
recovery of investment spending is reached in period t + 3.
If the staggered price adjustment is combined with asymmetric adjustment cost, recovery of in-
vestment is further retarded (see Figure B-5).
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Figure B-4: Investment around Tax Increase: Pre-Tax Price Effects
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Note: The figure depicts a numerical solution of the adjustment path to a tax increase by 1 percentage point in period
10. The retail price is assumed to increase by 0.25 percentage points in period 9, 0.5 percentage points in period 10,
and 0.25 percentage points in period 11. Adjustment cost is symmetric adjustment with common parameter c = 0.09.
All other parameters the same as those used for Figure B-1, i.e. σ = 0.21,  = 0.18, r = 0.0025, monthly depreciation
of to 0.022, b = 0.25.
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Figure B-5: Investment around Tax Increase: Pre-Tax Price Effects and Asymmetric Adj.Cost
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Note: The figure depicts a numerical solution of the adjustment path to a tax increase by 1 percentage point in period
10. The retail price is assumed to increase by 0.25 percentage points in period 9, 0.5 percentage points in period 10,
and 0.25 percentage points in period 11. Adjustment cost is asymmetric with c+ = 0.09 and c− = 0.59, as in Figure
B-3. All other parameters the same as those used for Figure B-1, i.e. σ = 0.21,  = 0.18, r = 0.0025, monthly
depreciation of to 0.022, b = 0.25.
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